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ABSTRACT 
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of South Sudan 
Master’s thesis 
Tampere University 
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November 2020 
 
The aim of this master’s thesis is to examine how the United Nations portrays the interlinkages between climate 
change and conflict in the context of the South Sudan. The study is narrowed down to focus specifically on 
one UN specialised agency (FAO) and three UN programmes (UNEP, UNDP and WFP). The analysis is 
conducted by mapping a set of hypothetical discourses, drawn from the theoretical framework, against the 
data retrieved from the examined UN documents. The UN discourses are then further critically examined with 
the help of Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework theory to elaborate on the results from a 
linguistic, discursive and contextual perspectives. Further on the thesis also discusses the extent to which the 
UN discourses reflect the academic debates on the topic as well as the situation in South Sudan. 
The thesis concludes that the UN actors portray the interlinkages with a mixture of different argumentation 
types, which form so-called hybrid discourses that are often represented, unconsciously or consciously, in a 
rather vague and discrepant manner. Interestingly, almost half of the examined documents did not contain any 
references emphasising the interlinkages between climate change and conflict. The further critical examination 
of the UN discourses also unveiled several alarming linguistic factors regarding particularly the concepts of 
responsibility and agency. Furthermore, the thesis found only weak alignment between the UN discourses, the 
academic debates and the existing situation on the ground. All of the highlighted factors run the risk of having 
a negative impact on the work of the examined UN actors, in addition to hindering the overall credibility of the 
whole UN system. 
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Tämä pro-gradu tutkielma tarkastelee Yhdistyneiden Kansakuntien (YK) toimijoiden tapaa kuvata 
ilmastonmuutoksen ja konfliktin välistä suhdetta Etelä-Sudanin tapaustutkimuksen kautta. Tutkielma pyrkii 
myös selvittämään missä määrin YK:n organisaatioiden asiakirjoissa esiin nousevat diskurssit vastaavat 
tieteellisiä keskusteluja ilmastonmuutoksen ja konfliktin välisestä suhteesta sekä Etelä-Sudanin vallitsevaa 
tilannetta. Tutkielma tarkastelee eritoten neljän YK:n toimijan diskursseja. Nämä toimijat ovat Maailman 
ruokaohjelma, YK:n elintarvike- ja maatalousjärjestö, YK:n ympäristöohjelma sekä YK:n kehitysohjelma. 
Tutkimus suoritetaan muodostamalla kuusi hypoteettista diskurssia, joita verrataan YK:n toimijoiden 
asiakirjoista saatua tietoa vastaan. Hypoteesidiskurssit on luotu tutkielman metodikappaleen perusteella. 
Tämän jälkeen tuloksia tarkastellaan Norman Faircloughin kriittisen diskurssianalyysin teorian avulla, joka 
erittelee diskurssien tutkimuksen kolmeen tasoon: tekstiin, diskurssikäytäntöön sekä sosiokulttuuriseen 
käytäntöön. 
 
Tutkimustulokset osoittavat YK:n toimijoiden käyttävän useita argumentaatiotyyppejä keskustellessaan 
ilmastonmuutoksen ja konfliktin välisestä suhteesta Etelä-Sudanin kontekstissa, näin ollen muodostaen niin 
sanottuja hybrididiskursseja. Nämä diskurssit ovat usein myös esitetty, joko tietoisesti tai tietämättömästi, 
ympäripyöreällä, epäpoliittisella sekä osittain epäjohdonmukaisella tavalla. Eniten dokumenteissa esiintyvät 
diskurssit liittyvät resurssien niukkuuteen sekä ihmisten turvallisuuteen. Yllättävää oli myös poliittisia ja 
sosioekonomisia seikkoja korostavien diskurssien vähäisyys sekä yhteistyötä korostavien diskurssien 
olemattomuus. Lisäksi mielenkiintoista oli se, että melkein puolet tutkituista asiakirjoista ei sisältänyt viitteitä, 
joissa korostettaisiin ilmastonmuutoksen ja konfliktien välisiä yhteyksiä. YK:n diskurssien kriittinen tutkimus 
paljasti myös useita huolestuttavia kielellisiä tekijöitä, jotka liittyivät erityisesti vastuunkannon ja edustuksen 
käsitteisiin. Tämän lisäksi tutkielma havaitsi vain heikonlaatuista yhdenmukaisuuta YK:n diskurssien, 
tieteellisten keskustelujen sekä Etelä-Sudanissa vallitsevan tilanteen välillä. Kaikki edellä mainitut tekijät voivat 
vaikuttaa kielteisesti niin tutkittujen YK:n toimijoiden työn tehokkuuteen kuin koko YK-järjestelmän 
uskottavuuteen. 
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Introduction  
 
Climate change represents one of the biggest challenges for the international community in 
the 21st century. Its detrimental socioeconomic, political and natural effects are increasingly 
troubling particularly for the most vulnerable communities around the world, which is why 
the issue is often present on the global political agenda.  Particularly the interlinkages between 
climate change and conflict have been increasingly discussed in the highest global forums, 
starting from the former United Nations Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon, who highlighted 
the need for a better understanding of climate change’s influence on conflict situations during 
then the largest-ever meeting of global leaders on climate change back in 2007 (UN News, 
2007). The interlinkages between climate change and conflict have already been studied for 
many years with the scholarly debate dating back to the late 1980s. However, the conclusions 
drawn by different actors from the UN to states, NGOs and academia, continue to differ 
significantly even today. These discrepancies within the debates highlight the need for not 
only a better understanding of the topic itself, but also an understanding of the construction 
of the arguments regarding the interlinkages of climate change and conflict, and how they 
intertwine with the social realities around them.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to critically examine how the UN has portrayed the interlinkages 
between climate change and conflict. Due to the fact that climate change is a highly spatially 
and temporarily dependent phenomenon, the research topic is narrowed down by focussing 
specifically on the case of South Sudan – a country whose short independent history is heavily 
influenced by on-going civil war as well as the increasing socioeconomic hardship affected 
by climate change. The decision to focus on a case study also contributes to a gap in the 
academic literature, as only very little research has been conducted on a case study basis 
regarding the interlinkages between climate change and conflict. Furthermore, the thesis will 
focus particularly on the discourses produced by the UN. This intergovernmental organisation 
represents a key actor within the promotion of global peace and prosperity, as well as an 
influential text producer with a wide readership and the ability to perform powerful speech 
acts. Thus, the way in which the UN actors portray issues through language has a significant 
effect on how these matters are then understood by the wider audiences. Moreover, the thesis 
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examines specifically the discourses of United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations (FAO) and United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), to further narrow 
down the research. Within the UN system, all these actors have identified climate related risks 
as relevant to their work in conflict affected areas and they are also actively involved in South 
Sudan. The specific research questions the thesis is asking are: 
 
1. How do the UN actors portray the interlinkages between climate change and conflict in the 
context of South Sudan? 
2. To what extent do the representations reflect the academic debates and the current situation 
on the ground?  
 
These questions will help guide the course of the research process. The thesis is divided into 
five chapters and the structure is as follows: The first chapter focusses on the background 
information regarding the South Sudanese conflict and the country’s history as the world’s 
newest nation. It will also elaborate more on the state of the environmental and climatic 
conditions in South Sudan, as well as share a brief literature review on previous studies 
regarding climate change, conflict and South Sudan. Chapter two introduces the theoretical 
framework of the thesis by giving an outline of the academic debates concerning the 
interlinkages between climate change and conflict. It will also establish the ‘hypotheses’ 
which will be used in the analysis to better understand what discourses are present in the 
examined UN documents.  The last section of the chapter gives concluding remarks regarding 
the framework, whilst simultaneously highlighting some issues regarding the state of the 
academic research on the topic. Chapter three discusses the methodological tools of analysis 
used to conduct the research. First, it gives a more detailed overview of the data collection 
process. This is then followed by a section on the research process, which focusses on 
discussing the critical discourse analysis approach that is also the methodology used for this 
research project. The last two parts of the chapter include a section on the limitations to study, 
as well as some ethical considerations and positionality regarding the research process. 
Chapter four focusses on conducting the actual analysis, tackling specifically the first research 
question set above and critically examining the highlighted UN discourses. Chapter five ties 
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the analysis together by discussing to what extent do the representations discovered in the 
analysis reflect the academic debates and the situation on the ground in South Sudan.  
   
Motivation for Study  
 
The motivation for this thesis stems from a personal interest in natural environment, and the 
role it plays in conflict dynamics as well as in peacebuilding processes. Climate change, in 
particular, presents one of the biggest challenges for the future of peace- and conflict research. 
The phenomenon has also been identified as a key challenge for the mandates of several 
international organisations dedicated to build and maintain a more peaceful and equal world. 
Thus, awareness of how the effects of climate change have been portrayed, discussed and 
understood in relation to conflict by the biggest international actors is crucial. The thesis does 
not attempt to prove any type of interlinkages but rather sheds light on the various ways in 
which they have been portrayed, and how these different discursive constructions could 
ultimately affect our actions. Discourses do not only shape our understanding of issues but 
also pose a risk of influencing social behaviour in ways, which may not necessarily be the 
most productive. Language and speech acts represent powerful tools for the shaping of social 
practices. 
  
I first became familiar with the conflict in South Sudan through a course during my 
undergraduate studies, which sparked my initial interest on the country and the devastating 
situation it has been facing for several years. After doing further research on the conflict and 
particularly the impacts of climate change in the area, I decided to use South Sudan as a case 
study for my research. It is an interesting research topic for several reasons. Firstly, South 
Sudan represents an exemplary case for the study of climate change and conflict due to the 
current state of on-going conflict and the geographical location. of the country. The Horn of 
Africa, which South Sudan politically forms part of, is considered one of most climate-
vulnerable areas in Africa, in addition to the Sahel region. Thus, the mixture of climate 
induced vulnerability and the high levels of instability, make South Sudan a prominent case-
study for my research. Secondly, there is not much research done on the topic of climate 
change and conflict in South Sudan. Such gap in the literature surprised me, because the 
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nearby conflict in Darfur, Sudan, has gotten significant attention regarding the same topic. 
The Darfur conflict has been widely studied and discussed through the climate-conflict nexus, 
and even labelled as the ‘first climate conflict’ by the UN back in 2007. Simultaneously, 
hardly any empirical research has been conducted regarding a very similar conflict in South 
Sudan, even though the two countries share a close history, exists in near geographical 
proximity and have a similar socio-economic situation. 
  
The reason why I wanted to examine how the UN actors have portrayed the interlinkages 
between climate change and conflict in the context of South Sudan, stemmed from the 
increasing attention given to the topic of climate change by the international community. The 
UN has recently paid a lot of attention to the phenomenon, and the potential effects it could 
have on the stability and development of several regions around the world. Thus, my 
assumption before starting the research process was that the interlinkages between climate 
change and conflict in the context of South Sudan would be heavily discussed amongst UN 
actors due to the similarities with the situation in Darfur. I also assumed to discover a 
substantive amount of literature and material on the topic through my data 
collection.  However, my initial hunch turned to be slightly mistaken in terms of the quantity 
of available data and the assumed general emphasis of the UN actors regarding the 
interlinkages between climate change and conflict in the context of South Sudan.  Despite 
these factors, an in-depth analysis was conducted on the topic. The next chapter will go 
through a brief history of South Sudan as the newest nation in the world, followed by an 
overview of the country’s climatic and environmental conditions. The chapter is then 
concluded with a literature review, which focusses on highting the existing academic research 
on topics of climate change, conflict and South Sudan.  
  
Chapter 1: The Background 
   
1.1 A brief history of modern South Sudan  
 
Mention South Sudan and images of poverty, starving children and on-going violence spring 
instantly to mind. The short history of what today is known as the Republic of South Sudan 
is one characterised by violence (Astill-Brown, 2014). The world’s newest state, which 
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gained its independence from Sudan in 2011, has experienced ongoing war throughout its 
nine years of statehood. In order to understand the situation South Sudan currently faces, we 
must first look further into the region’s history beyond the state’s independent existence. The 
state of Sudan, which South Sudan was previously part of, was created during the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium between 1898 and 1955. At the time, Britain and Egypt occupied the 
territory, holding two distinctive administrative arrangements for the South and the North 
(Natsios, 2012; UNDP, 2020). Since before colonial rule, a deep ethic, religious and cultural 
divide has existed between the North and the South of the country, which quickly turned 
violent upon the country’s independence. Sudan’s civil war is one of the longest conflicts in 
the African history to date. The first phase of the war began just before the state’s 
independence from the colonising powers in 1955 and continued up until 1972. The settlement 
was followed by ten years of relative peace until the fighting broke out again in 1983. There 
were several attempts to reach peace, which all failed as violence continued to intensify. Up 
until 2005, the relationship between Northern and Southern Sudan was heavily dominated by 
violent conflict (Astill-Brown, 2014; Maystadt et al., 2014). Famine and displacement were 
widespread across both parts of the country due to unequal governmental distribution of 
resources and general underdevelopment. 
 
Several factors contributed to the rise of conflict between the two parts of the country. The 
Sudanese civil war has often been described as a battle of religion between the Arab Muslim 
north and the mainly African Christian south. It is true that some factors in the rise of the 
conflict can be understood through the religious and ethnic differences between the regions, 
yet there are several other factors that have affected the escalation of the conflict, enabling its 
re-occurrence for almost 50 years. Factors such as poverty, underdevelopment, ethnic 
diversity, corruption, environmental hardship and various grievances all played a role in the 
creation of tension, which ultimately lead to conflict escalation. Another relevant factor worth 
mentioning was the division between the relatively wealthy and powerful Arab elites based 
in the capital and the marginalised and often impoverished societies on the periphery. The 
people of the South were particularly marginalised. Upon independence all positions of power 
were centralised and given almost entirely to the elite of the North. This created 
a neopatrimonial form of governance, which was centred in the capital, Khartoum. The newly 
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appointed government sought to enrich its members through the extraction of natural 
resources whilst turning a blind eye to the desperate needs of the Sudanese people, who were 
already suffering from famine, disease and poverty. The lack of political power, unjust 
distribution of resources and poor level of development in the South, led to rising unrest and 
eventually widespread violence between the two regions (Poggo, 2009).  
  
After decades of war, the year 2005 finally saw the acceptance of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) between the North and the South, which ended the extensive fighting 
between the two sides. The agreement was facilitated in a joint effort by regional authorities 
such as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and the international community, 
mainly headed by the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway. For the first time in 
history, the CPA opened the possibility for the South to officially break free from the North. 
It offered the southerners a change to gain their independence by granting them partial 
autonomy, establishing a new Interim Constitution and guaranteeing an opportunity for a 
referendum to be held on the issue of separation. (Astill-Brown, 2014; UNDP, 2020; Vox, 
2016). The history of modern South Sudan began in early 2011, when the referendum was 
held on the issue of separation. An overwhelming majority of South Sudanese people (almost 
99%) voted for separation and in favour of the creation of an independent state. The United 
Nations, the United States and the United Kingdom were the main allies supporting the 
creation of the new state (Astill-Brown, 2014; Vox, 2016). Thus, six months later the Republic 
of South Sudan was established in July 2011 (UNDP, 2020).  
   
Despite the initial victory, cracks started to appear in unanimous front of the newly founded 
state sooner than anticipated. The issues closely related to power, ethnicity and wealth, which 
had also defined the conflict with the North, slowly started to re-surface in the newly 
independent South Sudan. There are more than 60 different ethnic groups in the state of South 
Sudan; the two largest ethnic groups being Dinka (35.8%) and Nuer (15.6%). As previously 
mentioned, historically inter-tribal conflict was nothing new for South Sudan, yet prior to 
independence most of the ethnic groups had managed to put aside their differences in order 
to fight for the creation of their nation state. However, the unity was short-lived after the 
rivalry over power between the two biggest ethnic groups spiralled into violence. This is not 
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to suggest that attempts to establish a democratic and inclusive system of governance in South 
Sudan did not take place. On the contrary, initially the appointed Dinka President 
Salva Kiir asked the Nuer representative Riek Machar to be his vice president in an act of 
unity, which was needed to lay a solid foundation for the functioning of the new government 
(UNDP, 2020; Vox, 2016). However, these unity ties broke rapidly in 2013, after Vice 
President Machar was accused of planning a coup against President Kiir. The accusations led 
to a violent clash between Nuer and Dinka forces in the capital Juba. Machar also fled the 
country, denying all allegations made against him and heavily criticising the policies 
implemented by the new administration. Violence escalated as both sides used ethnic lines 
and hate speech to mobilise militias against each other. Several regional mediation efforts 
were conducted mainly by the Intergovernmental Authority of Development (IGAD) 
although with a low rate of success (Spaulding et al., 2019; UNDP, 2020; Vox, 2016).  
   
In 2015, the first peace deal together with a ceasefire agreement (named the ‘Compromise 
Peace Agreement) was established under severe pressure from the international community. 
In addition to the permanent ceasefire agreement, the deal called for the formation of a new 
transitional government laying out a fragile power-sharing agreement between Kiir and 
Machar. It also allowed Machar to return to Juba and to be sworn back in office as the vice 
president. However, it did not take long for both parties to violate the conditions of the 
agreement. After the second outbreak of violence in the capital, Machar was quickly removed 
from his position, forcing him to flee the country again (Christian Aid, 2019; Spaulding et al., 
2019). Several unsuccessful attempts of ceasefires and power-sharing agreements, followed 
by sharp spikes in violence levels, have taken place since the first peace deal in 
2015, highlighting the superficiality and fragility of peace in South Sudan (Africa Center for 
Strategic Studies, 2019; CRF, 2020). The latest effort to reach peace was made 
in February 2020 with the rivals Kiir and Machar signing yet another peace 
deal and forming a unity government in the hopes of ending the long civil war (BBC, 
2020). Riek Machar together with three other opposition leaders were sworn in office as Vice 
Presidents (BBC, 2020).  However, after several failed deals and the burden posed by 
the devastating effects of the current global covid-19 pandemic, it is no surprise that peace 
continues to stand on fragile grounds in South Sudan.  
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The world’s newest state has endured almost six and a half years of conflict, leaving the 
country in a state of on-going humanitarian crisis. The rebel in-fighting constitutes a large 
share of the fighting going on in South Sudan. The conflict has followed ethnic lines, such as 
the main rivalry between Dinka and Nuer, but simultaneously violent conflict also occurs 
between local communities. According to Global Conflict Tracker (CFR, 2020) more than 
400 000 people have died as a result of the war. Four million people are displaced, of which 
roughly 1.8 million people are internally displaced. In addition, more than 2.5 million people 
have fled the conflict to neighbouring countries, particularly to Uganda and Sudan. The 
highest number of fatalities have occurred in Jonglei, Equatorias and Unity States (Christian 
Aid, 2019). In addition, the ongoing violence has stopped food production, causing wide-
spread food shortages in the whole country. A state of famine was declared in 2017 and 
according to the latest estimations, over five million people are currently at risk of food 
insecurity (CFR, 2020).  
 
1.2 Climate and environment in South Sudan  
   
As the main aim of this thesis is to understand how climate change has influenced the way 
conflict is seen and understood in the context of South Sudan, the following section focuses 
on explaining the role that the climatic and environmental realities have played in the history 
of the country. The section highlights three key factors closely related to the environment 
and/or climate, which characterise the situation in South Sudan. These are followed by a brief 
analysis of their influence on the development of the conflict. The section is divided into three 
parts, which focus on the following issues as identified in the literature on climate change in 
South Sudan: environmental degradation, resource scarcity and climate variability. However, 
it is important to understand that the section does not attempt to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the effects climate and the environment have on the conflict dynamics in South 
Sudan, but rather to map out and introduce the main components regarding these factors. This 
is done to give the reader a better understanding of the situation and to lay the groundwork 
for the analysis, introduced in the following chapters.  
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South Sudan has a typical tropical savanna climate: a heavy rainy season with high humidity 
and large amounts of precipitation followed by a dryer season with little rainfall. The rainy 
season usually lasts from May to October with some variability on the length of the season. 
On the other hand, the winter season tends to be moderately shorter and dryer (Weather & 
Climate, no date). The lowest annual temperatures vary from 15 to 25 degrees depending on 
the region, whereas the highest annual temperatures range from 30 to 40 degrees. The highest 
temperatures usually occur before the rainy season commences in April/May. The country is 
covered in grassland, swamps and tropical forest depending on the area (Lovell-Hoare & 
Lovell-Hoare, 2013). 
   
It is important to understand that climate change as a phenomenon is nothing new in the 
history of South Sudan. Observations on rising temperatures and decreasing amounts of 
precipitation across the region date back to the 1980s. Throughout the years, the rising 
temperatures have unquestionably made weather patterns, and particularly rainfall, 
increasingly more erratic and unpredictable (Gov. of the Netherlands, 2018; WFP, 2017). 
Scientists have estimated that the temperature in South Sudan will rise 2.5 times more than 
the global average (Stalon and Choudhary, 2017). One important characteristic of climate is 
that its impacts vary greatly across and within regions. For example, in South Sudan, the latest 
rainfall data indicated increasing amounts of precipitation in the northern parts of the country, 
whilst the rainfall in southern and western South Sudan was declining (WFP, 2014). Some 
experts believe that the changes in weather are partially caused by ‘el Niño’. The term ‘el 
Niño’ refers to the warming phase of the el Niño Southern Oscillation, which is a 
”cyclical weather pattern that influences temperatures and rainfall across the globe” (OCHA, 
2017). El Niño has a severe impact on weather patterns around the world with unpredictable 
disruptions in winds, precipitation and temperature (OCHA, 2017). On the other hand, South 
Sudan is not a major contributor to the global warming, similarly to other developing 
countries in Africa, yet it does bear the consequences for it particularly in terms of 
development. The country produced 1,87 million tonnes of CO2 emissions in 2018 (Our 
World in Data, 2020), whereas the biggest polluter country China’s emissions were 10.06 
billion during the same year (Roser and Richey, 2019).    
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1.2.1. Environmental degradation  
   
Environmental degradation presents a significant hardship for South Sudan’s livelihoods and 
economy. It has also been argued to have indirectly influenced the development of the 
conflict by intensifying e.g. ethnic conflict over subsistence resources. Environmental 
factors including environmental degradation underpin both political and social instability in 
South Sudan. (Malith and Ahmed, 2017). However, it is important to understand that 
environmental degradation is predominantly a consequence of human induced 
activities, produced by continuous clearance of land, exploitation of natural resources, 
overgrazing and over-cropping. Such practices are conducted all over South 
Sudan (Elagib and Mansell, 2000). The consequences of these man-made actions include 
large-scale soil degradation, deforestation and loss of biodiversity, which are all 
predominantly consequences of modern agricultural activities. This is because South 
Sudanese society, much like Sudanese society, is heavily dependent on agriculture for their 
livelihoods. An estimated 95 per cent of the population is dependent on crop production, 
livestock husbandry, fishery or forestry for their daily income. Thus, agricultural activities 
form the core of South Sudan’s overall economy (Caas, 2007; FAO, 2020). Throughout the 
years, farming activities and techniques have evolved significantly, moving them increasingly 
away from traditional farming to a more modernised cash crop agriculture, which favours 
large-scale mechanised cultivation activities. This more ‘commercial’ type of agriculture may 
have allowed some farmers to marginally increase their profits, but simultaneously it has also 
had severe negative impacts on the natural environment. Furthermore, the excessive oil 
drilling activities in the wetlands contribute to the pollution of rivers and the nearby natural 
environment, whilst fish stocks continue to dramatically diminish due to increased over-
fishing (WHO, 2020).   
   
 
1.2.2. Resource scarcity  
   
Closely linked to the issue of increasing environmental degradation is resource scarcity. 
Geographically, the region where South Sudan is located has always been rich in natural 
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resources, including resources such as oil, marble, uranium, and timber. However, the 
historically inefficient natural resource management combined with the greedy and ruthless 
activities of the elites to ensure personal profit, meant that the wealth extracted from the 
resources was never equally distributed in socio-economic terms (Suliman, 1994).   The “lack 
of development of other no primary resources to grow the economy, combined with 
unsustainable practices, has created a pseudo-state of scarcity within an abundant resource 
base” (Malith and Ahmed, 2017, p.119). Thus, the situation in South Sudan is not necessarily 
about not having enough, but rather the people not having enough.  The unjust distribution of 
wealth, a remnant of colonialism, has evidently played a significant role in the intensifying 
friction between multiple ethnic groups. The combination of scarcity and ill-suited and unjust 
development policies have been the cause of many grievances and violence in the 
country (Malith and Ahmed, 2017). 
 
 In addition, ‘the black gold’ has been at the forefront of first Sudan’s and later also South 
Sudan’s economy, particularly for the elites since the discovery of oil throughout Southern 
Sudan and the Upper Nile in the late 1970s (Larsson, 2020). Oil has provided a major source 
of income for the State, simultaneously making it very vulnerable to any type of economic 
shocks. Upon independence, oil accounted for 98 percent of the government’s revenue and 
roughly 80 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Currently, oil accounts 
for 40 per cent of GDP, yet South Sudan remains the most oil-dependent country in the world, 
with oil accounting for almost all exports (Gibb, 2018; World Bank, 2019). This high 
dependency on oil has often come at the detriment of the natural environment. Due to its high 
market value, oil has also been at the centre of disputes and violence throughout the history 
of both Sudan and South Sudan.  The violent disputes over oil have often been about the 
control of the resources and wealth extracted from them. For example, shortly after the first 
Sudanese war and discovery of oil reserves in the South, the leaders of the North attempted 
to redraw the boundaries of the Southern Region in order to transfer discovered oilfields back 
into their controlled territory. The attempts failed, but ultimately the Khartoum government 
resorted into taking some territory by force, including areas near the border such as 
the Muglad Basin. The incident increased the tension between the North and the South even 
further (Larsson, 2020). After South Sudan’s independence, issues concerning oil transit fees 
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have been a major source of tension between the two countries. This is because, even 
though most oil reserves are in the South, the main pipelines exporting the extracted oil reside 
in Sudan. The unresolved dispute even resulted in South Sudan temporarily shutting down its 
oil production, putting severe pressure on the government and its allies through financial 
hardship (Pedersen and Bazilian, 2014). Even though South Sudan is one of the most oil 
dependant countries in the world, it is failing to manage its reserves sustainably and to attract 
foreign investment to ensure development and prosperity for its people (The World Bank, 
2020).  
   
Due to the changing climatic conditions, resources such as water and land have also been 
under dispute, particularly in the more rural areas of the country, where most of the South 
Sudanese population lives. Water and land both represent lifelines for the highly agricultural 
society, which is why the diminishing water supplies and destroyed areas of land represent 
significant hardship for the survival of the people (Malith and Ahmed, 2017; FAO, 
2020). However, whilst changing climatic patterns from droughts and floods to locusts and 
other pests have had a negative impact on the availability of some natural resources, it is the 
biased, inefficient and repressive development policies that have created the more large-scale 
issue of scarcity in both Sudan and South Sudan, which has further exacerbated the 
competition over diminishing natural resources (Goldsmith et al., 2002). Under the rule of the 
Khartoum regime, the decisions on developmental policies were often unsystematic, 
inefficient and even contradictory. The policies lacked “long-term vision and relied on 
institutions that were, and still are weak, corrupt and ineffective” (Caas, 2007, p.11). In 
addition, due to the prevalent underdevelopment,  the governments have been forced to 
finance their operations through the over-exploitation of natural resources, creating an 
unstable and unsustainable situation “where all actors, from the small-scale farmer to the 
highest echelon of government, rely on natural resources for either their survival and/or to 
make profit” (Caas, 2017, p. 19). Thus, resource scarcity and environmental degradation end 
up being more a result of political games rather than the result of changes in the natural 
environment. The current South Sudanese government has made efforts to improve the 
management of natural resources with the help of the United Nations Environmental Program 
(UNEP), yet very few concrete steps have been since taken to implement the current plan.  
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1.2.3. Climate variability  
   
Due to the high dependency on agricultural forms of living, climate variability has 
always influenced the livelihoods of the South Sudanese people. The changing weather 
patterns have destroyed crops, increased human mobility and inevitably hindered the 
countries development on different levels. Particularly, the South Sudanese food production 
has always been climatically reliant on rainfall, which consequently makes the most arid and 
semi-arid areas highly sensitive to climate shocks increasing environmental vulnerability 
(WFP, 2017). In addition, poverty and underdevelopment particularly in the more rural areas 
have made communities more vulnerable to the effects of climatic variability.  Furthermore, 
there have been some instances where the effects of climate variability have indirectly led to 
increasing risk of violent conflict, yet no causal relationships could be identified 
(Tiirmamer et al., 2018). For example, the floods of the 1960s had devastating consequences 
in Bor and Yirol district, particularly for the livelihood of the Dinka pastoralists, forcing them 
to migrate to the nearby state of Equatoria. The increased environmental vulnerability resulted 
into the movement of people towards the already occupied areas, causing tensions between 
the local Equatoria farmers and the Dinka over the usage of land. The situation would have 
not necessarily lead into an eruption of violence, but as the appearance of the Dinka groups 
in Equatoria fed into the Equatorians’ political grievances of Dinka domination on the 
regional government level, the clash was inevitably going to happen. Ultimately, the whole 
region was divided into the three separate administrative regions, sending the Dinka back to 
their original lands, which brought a temporary end to the conflict. (Tiitmamer et al., 2018)  
   
Later, similar events occurred in other areas. The floods of 1991 that destroyed crops and 
livestock in Upper Nile region have been argued to have played a role in the Dinka-Nuer 
Conflict, in addition to the multiple political and historical factors, including the SPLM/A 
split (Tiitmamer et al. 2018). Furthermore, the same floods and the destruction of Bor region 
by the Nuer White Army militias, forced the Dinka residing in Bor to migrate to Equatoria, 
which again caused increasing tension and ultimately conflict between the Dinka pastoralists 
and Equatoria farmers. (Tiitmamer et al. 2018). There is a clear tendency of low and high 
 20 
intensity tribal conflicts, particularly between the farmer and cattle herder societies, which 
has been present throughout the independent existence of both Sudan and South Sudan. 
Clashes over cattle raiding, trespassing, the burning of crops and grazing are all centuries old 
practices, which are highly tied to the natural environment in the form of environmental 
degradation, resource scarcity and climate variability (Caas, 2007).  
   
1.3 Literature review  
   
Even though the interlinkages of climate change and conflict are widely studied, there is only 
a limited amount of research conducted on South Sudan. The lack of academic research on 
the topic is most likely due to the newness of the state and the general low level of empirical 
data available. The latter is particularly affected by the ongoing conflict, which hinders the 
possibility to conduct thorough research in the area, and by weak national institutions with 
insufficient capacity and technology to aid the production of quality data. The following 
literature review highlights the main literature focused on the issues of climate change, 
environmental change and conflict in the context of South Sudan.  
   
Studies on climate vulnerability have emphasised South Sudan to be a highly sensitive area. 
Busby et al. (2013) find South Sudan to be one of the most climate vulnerable areas in Africa 
together with Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Sierra Leone and 
Somalia. Putoto’s (2018) commentary on South Sudan’s environmental vulnerability also 
highlighted the state’s poor performance on the global Climate change vulnerability index in 
2017. It also found that an increase in flood and drought rates to strengthen the probability of 
violent conflict via food and livelihood insecurity. Furthermore, academia and international 
organisations have both been concerned with the potential impact of climate change and 
conflict on the development of the new state. The South Sudanese government and United 
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) published the first report on sustainable 
environmental management called: South Sudan – first state of environment and outlook 
report in 2018. The report looks at the socioeconomic drivers of environmental change and 
outlines the necessary measures for more peaceful and prosperous co-existence through 
sustainable environmental management. It found that the increasingly more unpredictable 
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weather patterns caused by climate change combined with rapid population growth are “likely 
to see a rise in clashes over natural resources, reflecting how climate change can contribute 
to conflict” (p.13).  
   
Ensor’s study (2013) on the role of youth in peace-building and post-conflict recovery in the 
Greater Equatoria region found that the consequences of climate change together with the 
long history of violence make the region one of the most vulnerable, underdeveloped and 
conflict-prone areas of South Sudan. The study focused particularly on the crucial role of the 
youth in solving the situation, as the young nation practically relies on “--the young 
population’s positive contributions to climate change adaptation, human development and 
sustainable peace” (p.528). Maystadts et. alt’s (2014) study focussed on the links between 
localised weather shocks and conflict in North and South Sudan from 1997 to 2009 using a 
pixel-level analysis. The study found that temperature anomalies do strongly increase the risk 
of conflict. It also highlighted water scarcity to be the main driver of such relationship as the 
communities in region are highly dependent on agriculture and pastoralism for their 
livelihoods.  
 
Regarding debates on resource scarcity and its security implications, Cascao’s (2013) study 
on resource-based conflicts in both South Sudan and Ethiopia’s Gambella establishes an 
intimate link between scarcity, political volatility, economical fragility and the conflict 
escalation.  According to this analysis, the battle over the control of scarce resources does fuel 
conflict. In South Sudan the resource related conflict is not only about oil wealth, but also 
about the management and control of scarce renewable resources such as water and land, 
which both are highly vital resources for the society highly dependent of agro-pastoralism. 
Yoshida’s (2013) work on interethnic conflict in the Jonglei State also found that climate 
change has exacerbated the competition over scarce resources in region, which consequently 
has intensified the conflicts and developed ethnic cleavages amongst the communities. 
Furthermore, Harragin’s (2011) study on the concept of protection within the counties of 
Jonglei state highlighted that the fighting between Dinka, Nuer and Murle groups is rooted in 
various factors. These factors include heightened inter-ethnic tensions, increasing flow of 
small weapons, the rising amount of deprived and armed youth, resource competition (e.g. 
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water and land) and the political economy of cattle raiding. The latter two are both linked to 
scarcity, environment and climate.  
   
Maxwell et al. (2012) research focused on examining the concepts of livelihoods, social 
protection and basic services in South Sudan. The study highlighted the rapidly increasing 
degradation of land and water supplies to have increased the tension between local societies, 
which represents a prominent challenge particularly for the livelihood recovery of the 
communities. Even though, the so-called “resource conflicts” are nothing new in the history 
of South Sudan, the increasing rate of environmental degradation was deemed alarming due 
to its ability to multiply the potential negative effects.  Selby and 
Hoffman’s (2014) study critiques the often uncontested mainstream academic and policy 
accounts which explain the relations between environmental change and conflict through 
the concepts of scarcity, state-failure and under-development and arguing the approach to be 
ill-suited in the context of the Sudans. Instead, they emphasise the need for the international 
community to focus on concepts of resource abundance, state building and 
development in making sense of the relation between environment and conflict. Moreover, 
their approach finds that political economic dynamics have had far more impact on 
the environment-related conflicts in the Sudans than resource availability.   
   
Specific literature examining the nature of the interlinkages between climate change and 
conflict in the context of South Sudan is very limited. One of the only studies focusing on the 
topic is by Tiitmaer et al.’s (2018), whose research investigated the extent to which climate 
change and climate variability events link with eruptions of conflict in South Sudan. The study 
was conducted by using meteorological data and conflict records in addition to data on floods 
and droughts. Tiitmaer et al. (2018) emphasised the need for the evaluation of “climate 
change-conflict nexus in the context of South Sudan, as climate change has become a 
significant driver of conflicts in places where communities mostly depend on natural 
resources” (p.3). The study did not find sufficient evidence to draw a direct link between 
climate change and the rise of conflict, but it did emphasise the importance of environmental 
conditions for regional stability in South Sudan. Thus, the area with high risk of natural 
disasters, such as floods and drought, were also found the most prone for conflict.  
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The literature review demonstrated that the relation of climate change and conflict in South 
Sudan have to an extent been discussed and analysed by academia and other international 
organisations, particularly in terms of vulnerability, development and resource scarcity. 
However, the literature on particularly the nature of the interlinkages between climate change 
and conflict in South Sudan was limited. As the overall goal of the thesis is to understand, 
how UN actors have portrayed the interlinkages between climate change and conflict in the 
context of South Sudan, the following chapter will establish the theoretical framework for the 
study.  
   
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1. Discourses on climate change and conflict 
 
The following chapter will introduce the theoretical framework used in the thesis, which 
focusses on highlighting the most relevant debates regarding the interlinkages between 
climate change and conflict. Due to the extensive amount of literature on the interlinkages, 
the discourses have been divided under five broader sub-categories: ‘climate security’, 
‘human security’, ‘threat multiplier’, ‘socioeconomic and political factors’ and ‘cooperation’. 
The debates highlighted in the theoretical framework will be also used to identify a set 
hypothetical discourses (the hypotheses) for the study. Further on, these hypotheses will be 
mapped against the discovered UN discourses, in order to better understand how the UN 
actors have portrayed the interlinkages between climate change and conflict in the context of 
South Sudan. Moreover, the chapter will be concluded with a brief analysis of the overall 
theoretical framework and the introduced academic discourses, highlighting some of the key 
issues regarding the research on the topic. I have intentionally not included detailed 
information on the debates concerning migration, conflict and climate change, as they 
constitute a broad and separate branch within the study of climate change and conflict. Thus, 
they would require an individual study of their own, which I will not be able to conduct due 
to time and word count limitations. However, the aspect of migration would present a suitable 
topic for further studies on the interrelation between climate change and conflict. The 
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following subsections will now introduce some of the key debates regarding the interlinkages 
between climate change and conflict as well as present the identified hypotheses that shall be 
tested further on the study. 
 
2.1.1. Climate security  
  
One of the most popular ways of framing climate change and its impacts on societies has been 
through a security lens. Security driven discourses focus predominantly on potential threats 
that climate change may pose to national and global security. Even though climate security 
discourses have been around since late 1980s, it was not until mid-2000 that the securitisation 
of issues related to climate change started to gain wider popularity amongst academia, 
policymakers and the international community (Bettini, 2014a; Hartmann, 2010; Oels, 2013; 
Boas, 2015; Rothe 2016).  The theory of securitisation is the most prominent concept of the 
Copenhagen School of security studies, and it refers to a process of transforming subjects, 
such as climate change, into matters of ‘security’ through politisation that is conducted 
through a speech-act. (Buzan et al., 1998). The year 2007 was particularly remarkable for the 
climate security discourses in terms of global attention. Both the European Council and the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) debated the issue of climate change in their 
respective meetings, placing it on “the highest level of political discourse on the matter of 
international peace and security” (Huntjens and Nachbar, 2015, p. 13). In addition, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its newest report on climate 
change and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize together with Al Gore on their remarkable 
efforts in combating climate change (Nobel Peace Prize, 2007). The securitisation move and 
the increased attention that followed, also meant that the discussions on climate security and 
‘climate-conflict nexus’ began to reach higher political stages, with governments of states 
such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and India all identifying climate 
change as a challenge for national security (McDonald, 2013; Huntiens and Nachbar, 2015)   
  
The idea of climate security threats, particularly in developing countries, builds on the rather 
alarmist work of Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999) who was concerned with the social effects of 
resource scarcity and its potential negative implication for global order. The study found 
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causal relationships between resource scarcity and conflict, pinpointing precisely 
environmental degradation as the main driving force for scarcity and thus consequently for 
conflict. In this context, the combination of inevitable global population growth and the 
unequal resource management could ultimately lead to the eruption of conflict, particularly 
in the less developed communities. Even though the approach was first met with hesitation 
and objection, it still managed to attract research funds and interest amongst the scholarly. 
This was partially because at the time Homer-Dixon was successful in conceptualising a 
variety of rising conflict situations, such as the ones in Somalia and Rwanda, by offering a 
precise framework that provided a more convincing rationale in comparison to previously 
used ideological grounds (Matthew, 2002, p. 116). The most prominent ways that climate 
change is assumed to threaten national and global security are by a) fuelling conflicts over 
scarce resources, b) destabilising already fragile states and c) inducing both internal and 
global waves of migration (Bettini, 2014a; Detraz and Betsill, 2009; Hartmann, 
2010; Methmann and Rothe, 2012; Rothe, 2012; Boas, 2015).  Another framing, also deriving 
from Homer-Dixon’s (1991) earlier work, describes particularly climate induced 
environmental degradation as potential exaggerator of conflict. Such framing has been 
particularly common amongst Western politicians and scientists who shared an understanding 
of so-called secondary implications of climate change (Methmann and Rothe, 2012), which 
were seen to place the Global North in danger of potential climate-induced spill-over effects 
from the Global South (Boas and Rothe, 2016). With these remarks, the first two hypothesis 
that the UN discourses will be mapped against are ”climate change, through environmental 
degradation, is contributing to the eruption of conflict” and ”increasing resource scarcity due 
to climatic changes causes conflict”.  
   
2.1.2. Human Security  
  
The discourses focussing on human security emphasise the negative effects of climate change 
on the existing socio-economic stresses that threaten human security. “Climate change is 
understood as a threat to human security in that it disrupts the capacity of both individuals 
and communities to adapt to changing conditions, usually by multiplying existing or creating 
new strains on human livelihood” (Huntjens and Nachbar, 2015, p. 5). It could exacerbate 
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socioeconomic stresses such as resource scarcity, arable land, weakening institutions and 
forced migration, which consequently could increase the chances of the eruption of violent 
conflict (Huntiens and Nachbar, 2015)  
   
Across academic and policy communities the notion that climate change will most 
devastatingly affect those that are the least able to adapt to it, is strong. Even though the 
impacts of climate change are predicted to be the most detrimental in the Global South, the 
issue of climate insecurity is not tied to the distinctions between the North and the South or 
between developed and developing countries. As a global phenomenon, climate change will 
impact all ways of life, affecting the security of every individual and community around the 
world. Thus, the discourses focussing on human security have increasingly gained interest 
and challenged the more state-centric discourses on climate change and conflict. Furthermore, 
human security discourses have been developed into two distinctive approaches: some 
focussing on vulnerability and others focussing on resilience.  
 
Discourses on vulnerability emphasise that debates on climate change and conflict should 
focus on recognising climate change as “accelerant of vulnerabilities”, rather than threat-
multipliers in relation to conflict situations (Jasparro and Taylor, 2008, p. 237; O’Neil, 2011). 
In other words, this would mean a transition from more threat-centred frameworks to the ones 
emphasising and assessing vulnerabilities (Detraz, 2011). Contemporary intrastate conflicts 
are prominently taking place in the developing countries. These states are also usually situated 
in the most climatically vulnerable areas with little or no capacity to contest to climate-
induced hazards (Huntjens and Nachbar, 2015). As demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
climate change can hinder the conditions required for sustaining traditional livelihoods. 
Furthermore, poverty and marginalisation can also have negative impacts on adaptation 
efforts, and even increase relative deprivation in the increasingly more resource scarce areas 
(Huntjens and Nachbar, 2015).  The vulnerability discourses also emphasise that climate 
change does not solely drive conflict vulnerability, but vice versa: conflict also increases 
climate vulnerability (Buhaug, 2016; Abraham and Carr, 2017, IPCC, 2014, p. 758). ”The 
negative impact of conflict on vulnerability manifests in negative impacts on long-term 
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investment, infrastructure, and human suffering leading to communities’ with limited 
resilience to climactic shocks” (Abraham and Carr, 2017, p. 238). 
   
Discourses on resilience stress ”rationales and practices such as adaptation to risk, shared 
responsibility, and self-capacity to achieve human security” (Boas and Rothe, 2016, p. 622). 
They focus on the capabilities, which communities acquire to recover from climatic shocks 
and to adapt to the changing environmental conditions (Zebrowski, 2015, p.5). They 
challenged the traditional climate security discourses by rejecting the simplistic and 
mechanistic understanding of causality that emphasised direct linkages between climate 
change and conflict (Bettini, 2014b, p. 182). The resilience discourses emphasise long-term 
solutions, instead of focussing on ‘hard security’ as the base for climate action, which are 
often defined by only short-term solutions (Boas and Rothe, 2016). The emphasis on 
resilience within the wider context of climate change and conflict debates, is seen as a highly 
productive approach to discuss the issue, as it focuses on action rather than just explaining 
the phenomenon. This is crucial for the resolving the problem itself. (Abrahams and Carr, 
2017; Boas and Rothe, 2016). The resilience discourses also focus on the creativity and self-
adaptive potential of all systems and communities, transferring the responsibility for coping 
with climatic change ”from the state to networks of public and private organisations, 
communities and individuals” (Joseph, 2013, p. 43). Thus, the third identified hypothesis that 
the UN discourses will be mapped against is “climate change increases vulnerability, which 
poses a threat to human security”.  
   
2.1.3. Threat multiplier  
 
The threat multiplier discourses focus on the idea that climate change does not directly cause 
conflict, but rather makes current causes for conflict more salient. The discourse became 
widely known and embraced after the Centre for Naval Analysis Report on the subject was 
published in 2007. The idea of climate change being a ‘threat multiplier’ pushed the debated 
away from causal and deterministic argumentations. The threat multiplier discourse was first 
introduced from a more security and defence related perspective but overtime it has also been 
increasingly embraced by the non-security orientated actors such as humanitarians, 
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environmentalists and development experts. Even today, the discourse remains extremely 
popular and used, particularly in the policymaking and advocacy circles. For example, the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has recognised the effects climate change may have 
on global peace and security, framing it as a prominent ‘threat multiplier’. Climate change is 
understood to fuel the complex conflict situations through several political social, economic 
and demographic factors.  
  
The most radical experts claim that existing vulnerabilities, strengthened by climate change, 
can increase the risk of political instability and even terrorism (Banuciewicz, 2014). On the 
other hand, scholars within policy circles tend to emphasise the fact that climate change and 
resource scarcity pose a significant threat multiplier in terms of conflict risk (Boas and 
Rothe, 2016; Abrahams, 2019). For example, Evans (2010) highlights that eruptions of 
conflict could rise from e.g. tensions over access and/or control of scarce resources, leading 
to further state fragility and climate induced, and scarcity driven unplanned mass migration. 
However, he also acknowledges that the impacts caused by climate change and scarcity have 
much to do with economic, social, institutional and ecological vulnerabilities of the society. 
In the context of South Sudan, Tamela Knight’s (2013) study supports Evans’s theory, 
pinpointing climate change as an undisputable intensifier of conflict, particularly between the 
ethnic groups in South Sudan. Burke et al.’s (2009) study also supported this notion, 
highlighting the fact that climate change could lay the groundwork for the eruption of conflict, 
even though it is not able to directly, on its own, cause conflict. The study found strong 
historical linkages between civil war and rising temperatures in Africa, highlighting that the 
warmer the year the more significant increase was witnessed in the likelihood of violent 
conflict. Climate induced stresses, thus, act as threat multipliers, because of their ability to 
contribute to and exacerbate conflict (Ruttinger et al., 2015; Raleigh and Kniveton, 2012). 
The main issues with these discourses lie in the notion that climate change as a phenomenon 
is widely tied to temporal- and spatial variables. This means that the impacts of climate 
change, which in some scenarios might drive conflict will not do so in others. Thus, where 
and when to adopt the ‘threat multiplier’ discourse regarding the effects of climate change, 
remains a question (Abrahams and Carr, 2017). Regarding the case of South Sudan, the fourth 
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identified hypothesis, which the UN discourses will be mapped against, is: “climate change 
does not directly lead to conflict, yet it makes current causes for conflict more salient.”   
 
2.1.4. Socioeconomic and political factors  
  
The more critical scholars have highlighted the importance of the other socioeconomic and 
political factors within the interplay of climate change and conflict. The most prominent 
criticism emphasises the importance of social factors in the eruption of violent conflict. It is 
mostly targeted towards the discourses focussed on traditional climate security, which tend to 
emphasise direct links between climate change, resource scarcity and conflict.  For 
example, Salehyan (2008) questions the accuracy of proposed interlinkages, claiming that the 
discourses focussing on causal relationships completely ignore the complex social structures 
of the society within their analysis. His study points out that often the fundamental purpose 
of armed conflict is in social struggle, which usually has very little to do e.g. with the level of 
resources available. Instead, armed conflict is often used as a tool to contest the failures of 
political processes or the inexistence of political will to deliver wanted change. Thus, there 
should be more emphasis on “the interaction between environmental and political systems”, 
as it represents a more critical factor for the understanding armed conflict (Salehyan, 2008, 
p.318). Currently, there is no way to predict outbreaks of armed conflict purely by analysing 
climatic or environmental conditions. For a causal climate-conflict link to exist, all situations 
regarding natural disasters, changing migratory patterns and diminishing natural resources 
should result into conflict. However, this is hardly ever the case.  “Resource scarcity, natural 
disasters, and long-term climate shifts are ubiquitous, while armed conflict is rare” (Salehyan, 
2008, p. 319).  
  
Moreover, Barnett and Adger (2007) argued that in certain circumstances climate change 
could indeed increase the risk of violent conflict through “direct effects on livelihoods and 
indirect effects on state functions” (p. 640). However, this would not happen in isolation from 
various other important social factors, such as poverty, grievances, social cohesion and access 
to economic opportunities (p. 644). Thus, it is vital to take into consideration all the various 
aspects shaping the situation, rather than focusing solely on a causal relationship between 
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climate and conflict. The downfall of the study is that the established connections are yet to 
be empirically proven, which is the case in many studies highlighting linkages between 
climate change and conflict. Studies (Fearon, 1995; Salehyan, 2008) have also emphasised 
civil war to be an ineffective, counter-productive and costly manner to respond to e.g. 
resource scarcity - if conflict was to be seen as a strategic response to resource scarcity, it 
would be a poor one. Violence is extremely draining for the well-being of natural 
environment.  This means that conflict would only diminish the already scarce resources, 
leaving communities with even less than what they previously had (Fearon, 1995; Salehyan, 
2008).  There is a wide body of empirical case studies, particularly focusing on pastoralism, 
forestry and agriculture in Africa, which oppose the more traditional climate security as well 
as environment security discourses regarding scarcity, population and the rise of 
conflict (Gausset et al., 2005; Derman et al., 2007)  
   
Salehyan (2008) also stresses the responsibility of governmental bodies in managing 
resources and addressing scarcity to prevent the rise of conflict.  In other words, a high 
emphasis on climate change -conflict nexus as a justification for conflict and instability could 
allow “decisionmakers to shift the blame for civil wars and grave human rights violations” to 
predominantly on climate change (Salehyan, 2008, p. 317). However, the changing climatic 
conditions should not be used as a scapegoat for the lack of effective governance. In the 
context of South Sudan, this a valid concern, considering the amount of attention given on 
environmental issues within the country on top of the work done by UN actors on improving 
environmental conditions.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to remember that existing power structures within communities 
often determine the ways in which diminishing resources are distributed. Thus, 
“socioeconomic marginalisation or discrimination based on group membership may be 
equally important in determining vulnerability to climate change as the environmental 
changes themselves” (Huntjens and Nachbar, 2015, p.6). Barnett and Adger (2007) 
emphasised that if the effects climate change has on livelihoods, are not address by e.g. 
facilitation of alternative livelihood opportunities or other sufficient social safety nets, an 
eruption of violent conflict could potentially occur. Based on these remarks, the fifth 
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identified hypothesis is: “complex political and socioeconomic structures of society cannot 
be separated from the study on climate change and conflict”.  
 
2.1.5. Cooperation  
  
Climate change and conflict can be also analysed and understood through discourses 
emphasising cooperation. Instead of focussing on ‘climate-conflict nexus’ or ‘resource 
scarcity’, these discourses highlighted concepts such as ‘interdependence’ and ‘sustainable 
development’ (Brauch, 2009; Hagmann, 2005; Harari, 2008; Wolf, 2007).  The cooperation 
discourses also deviated the debate on climate change and conflict closer to the ideology 
behind ‘environmental peacebuilding’. The initial term was introduced 
in Conca and Dabelko’s work in 2002, which focussed on examining shared natural resources 
as a conflict resolution tool rather than a conflict agitator. Thus, environmental 
peacebuilding theory withholds the idea that resources do not always necessarily fuel conflict, 
but that they could stimulate cooperation as well. The discourse focuses on how natural 
resource management may benefit peacebuilding efforts, especially in intrastate conflict (not 
only interstate conflict). However, the approach is very contested, as other scholars have 
emphasised the need to expand its evidence base in order to strengthen the discourse’s 
credibility. It has had moderate success in the policy side, but less within academia (Evans 
Odgen, 2018). Many scholars and organisations are increasingly focusing on environmental 
cooperation as “a potential peacebuilding tool to address resource-driven conflicts and 
beyond” (Dresse et alt. 2019, p. 100). For example, several studies on water scarcity have 
found that communities are more likely to result to cooperation through negotiations 
and/political confrontation instead of conflict over water resources. (Gleick, 1993; Trombetta, 
2012; Witsenburg and Roba, 2007). Drawing on these debates and the debates regarding 
resilience mentioned in previous sections, the sixth identified hypothesis that the UN 
discourses will be mapped against further on in the research, is: “the relationship between 
climate change and conflict in South Sudan should be discussed through long-terms solutions 
emphasising resilience and/or cooperation”.  
   
In conclusion, the theoretical framework, which highlighted some of the key debates 
regarding the interlinkages between climate change and conflict, was used to identify six 
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potential hypothetical discourses (hypotheses) for the study. These hypotheses were drawn to 
guide the research and help it examine how the UN discourses on South Sudan reflect what 
we know about the links between climate change and conflict, which ultimately helps the 
thesis understand how the UN actors have portrayed the interlinkages. In the analysis, this 
will be done by mapping the gathered data against regarding the UN discourses against the 
set hypothesis drawn from the theoretical framework. The set hypotheses were as followed:  
   
1. Climate change, through environmental degradation, is contributing to the eruption of 
conflict  
2. Increasing resource scarcity due to climatic changing causes conflict  
3. Climate change increases vulnerability, which leads to eruption of conflict  
4. Climate change does not directly lead to conflict, yet it makes current causes for conflict more 
salient  
5. Complex political and socioeconomic structures of society cannot be separated from the study 
on climate change and conflict   
6. The relationship between climate change and conflict in South Sudan should be discussed 
through long-terms solutions emphasising resilience and/or cooperation    
 
 
2.2. Conclusions drawn from the theoretical framework  
   
Four conclusions rise from analysing the large pool of discourses on climate change and 
conflict. Firstly, the literature on the interlinkages of climate change and conflict is very 
mixed, with significant discrepancies between the debates. One reason for such discrepancies 
is because the scholars have adopted a broad range of different “methodological approaches, 
units of analysis, temporal scales, indicators of climate/weather, and definitions of conflict” 
(Salehyan, 2014, p. 2). This type of pluralist approach can be a productive manner to conduct 
research at times, but it can also lead to a variety of mixed findings, as it has in the case of 
climate-conflict research. Researchers have not reached consensus on the nature of the 
relationship, what are its specific effects (how exactly does climate affect conflict) and under 
what conditions. Secondly, even though a great amount of scientific research and empirical 
evidence has been found on climate change, the evidence base linking climate change and 
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conflict remains weak. Partially, this has to do with the relation of the two concepts. There is 
no pattern or algorithm that would be able to explain all climatic variabilities in all contexts. 
The effects of climate change vary tremendously within countries and even within cities, 
which means that a generalised analysis will not be able to produce reliable and concrete 
findings that would accurately describe all potential scenarios. Thus, regional mapping 
becomes very limited, which makes the understanding of long-term consequences difficult 
(Evans, 2008). The lack of reliable data also presents a significant problem for future research 
on climate change and conflict.  Currently, not even the climate scientists are able to pinpoint 
the exact timelines and potential effects that humanity might face in the near future due to 
climate change. There is an increasing need for more case-study based and context-specific 
research that would include sub-national policies and local realities into its analysis.  The 
development of new technology, able to anticipate the potential outcomes of the changing 
climate, is also required for more accurate and evidence-based research. Particularly, the 
studies focusing on climate security discourses have been criticised for the poor evidence base 
of their research. For example, Nordas and Gleditsch (2007) raised concerns over the limited 
amount of peer reviewed research articles and the lack of solid case-specific empirical 
evidence regarding the research on the relationship between climate change, conflict and 
security. They stated that these analyses constructed their argumentation from assumptions 
rather than evidence, and that ‘statements about security implications have so far largely been 
based on speculation and questionable sources’ (Nordas and Gleditsch, 2007, p. 628). There 
continues to be a growing need for more case-study based and detailed academic research on 
interlinkages climate change and conflict, and for a creation of larger data bases regarding the 
issue.  
   
Thirdly, the connections between the impacts of climate change and the rise of conflict are 
highly spatially- and timely related. As already mentioned, the effects of climate can vary 
greatly not only between states but also within states. In order to establish a strong causal 
relation between climate change and the eruption of conflict, scholars would have to prove 
patterns that are replicable in different scenarios. However, this very hardly the case, as 
factors that result into conflict in one place, may not do so in other. Furthermore, the fact that 
scholars use different units of temporal scales in their studies, results into further 
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discrepancies within the findings (Salehyan, 2014). “Natural disasters such as cyclones and 
floods may unfold in a matter of days, droughts can span several years, and climate change 
itself implies long term changes in observed conditions over decades or centuries” (Salehyan, 
2014, p. 3). Some scholars have examined the interlinkage between climate change and 
conflict through the “short-term shocks” in precipitation or temperature (Hendrix and Glaser, 
2007; Landis, 2014), whereas others have focusses on the longer-term processes that are only 
visible in much longer time intervals (Zhang et al., 2007). Fourthly, both climate and conflict 
are too complex and elusive concepts to be explained through single-explicatory causes. The 
field of climate conflict studies has yet to establish any collectively accepted definitions of 
either ‘climate change’ or ‘conflict’, which means that scholars have 
utilised various definitions, when examining the interlinkages between the two phenomena. 
Particularly the reasons behind an eruption of conflict are highly multidimensional, meaning 
that direct causal linkages are almost impossible to establish on their own. This notion is 
supported by the discovered lack of evidence on the interlinkages of climate change and 
conflict. The understanding of the multifaceted ways, in which climate change interacts with 
drivers of conflict, is highly crucial for research now and in the future. Particularly so that 
investments end up going in the right place.  
 
2.3. The four UN actors & their organisational interpretations of the interlinkages  
 
In order to reach a more comprehensive understanding of the UN discourses regarding the 
case of South Sudan, it is important to take a step back to see how the examined UN actors 
have discussed the interlinkages between climate change and conflict in the wider 
organisational context. All of the four actors: WFP, UNEP, FAO and UNDP have discussed 
the topic, even though the main focus regarding the interlinkages between climate change and 
conflict does varies across organisations. The following sections will provide a brief overview 
of each organisations’ main arguments regarding the interlinkages between climate change 
and conflict. 
 
The World Food Programme 
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WFP has focussed on discussing the interlinkage between climate change and conflict largely 
through the aspects of food insecurity and vulnerability. Their reports have singled out climate 
change induced conflict as one of the main drivers of the increasing food insecurity levels 
around the world (WFP, 2017; FAO et al. 2017) as well as emphasised how in situations 
where ” conflict and climate shocks occur together, the impact on acute food insecurity is 
more severe” (FAO et al. 2018, p. 58) . In 2019 the agency produced a report exclusively 
discussing the interlinkages between climate change and conflict and their impacts for WFP’s 
work. The “Climate Change and Conflict” brief, published in September 2019, identifies 
climate change as a risk multiplier particularly within the societies that are already more prone 
to social tension and/or unrest. “While climate change cannot be identified as the only reason 
for conflict, it amplifies and compounds those inequalities and vulnerabilities that often 
underpin conflict” (WFP, 2019c, p. 1). Climate change is also described to have “complex 
interactions with the political, social, economic and environmental drivers of conflict” (WFP, 
2019b, p.1), yet the ways in which these interactions are outplayed are not comprehensively 
understood. Furthermore, the brief (WFP, 2019b) finds climate-induced environmental 
factors, such as water scarcity and loss of pasture resources, to increase tensions within 
communities that are highly dependent on agriculture or animal husbandry. In addition, 
economic factors such loss of livelihoods, decreasing agricultural productivity, food 
insecurity and other economic shocks are considered issues that can also contribute to 
likelihood of violent conflict in the most vulnerable societies. Furthermore, socio-political 
dimensions such as migration, income disparity and inequality, disruption of political 
institutions and land inequality are stated to increase the likelihood for the eruption of conflict 
(WFP, 2019b).  
 
The United Nations Environmental Programme 
 
The initial spark for UNEP’s work on climate change and security dates back to the late 2000s 
when Jan Egeland, then the UN Special Envoy for Climate Change, requested the agency “to 
conduct an analysis of climate change and security risks in the Sahel Region” (UNEP, 2020). 
Ever since, the agency has discussed the interlinkages between climate change and conflict in 
its publications (e.g. UNEP, 2011; G7, 2015), identifying climate change as “the ultimate 
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“threat multiplier” aggravating already fragile situations and potentially contributing to 
further social tensions and upheaval” (UNEP, 2020). In their 2011 report on the livelihood 
security in the Sahel region, the agency highlighted that: ”the impacts of changing climatic 
conditions on the availability of natural resources, coupled with factors such as population 
growth, weak governance and land tenure challenges, have led to increased competition over 
scarce natural resources – most notably fertile land and water – and resulted in tensions and 
conflicts between communities and livelihood groups (p. 6). Furthermore, UNEP has the most 
security focussed approach to the issue of climate change and conflict out all the four actors. 
This is evident in examining UNEP’s active collaboration with the UN Security Council 
(UNSC), particularly in providing information regarding the security implications of climate 
change and conflict with a focus on the effects of environmental degradation and resource 
scarcity.  For example, in a UNSC meeting (20th July 2011), then the Executive Director of 
UNEP, Achim Steiner, stated climate change to be a “threat multiplier” that would have 
”fundamental implications for weather, settlements, infrastructure, food insecurity, 
livelihoods and development. Competition over scarce water and land, exacerbated by 
regional changes in climate, was already a key factor in local conflicts in Darfur, the Central 
African Republic, northern Kenya and Chad”. He continued by emphasising the importance 
of a deliberate and collective response to address issues: ”Indeed, there is no reason why the 
international community cannot avoid escalating conflicts, tensions and insecurity related to 
a changing climate if a deliberate, focused and collective response can be catalysed that 
tackles the root causes, scale, potential volatility and velocity of the challenges emerging”  
(Steiner, 2011 in UNSC, 2011). 
 
UNEP’s work has also touched upon the prevention and management of land and natural 
resource conflicts, where they have highlighted the importance of the concept of vulnerability. 
“The impact of climate change and natural hazards need to be understood within the context 
of vulnerability. Vulnerability represents the interface between exposure to physical threats 
and the capacity of people and communities to cope with those threats. Adapting to climate 
change and reducing risks from natural hazards involves reducing the exposure of 
populations to the potential impacts, while increasing their adaptive capacity and resilience 
(UN Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action, 2012)”. Furthermore, UNEP also 
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published a climate-fragility risk guidance note in collaboration with the European Union 
(EU) in 2019, which aims to inform key actors on how to build resilience by linking 
sustainable livelihoods, climate change adaption and peacebuilding (UNEP, 2019). 
 
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Programme 
 
FAO has discussed the interlinkages between climate change and conflict largely through the 
issue of food security. In FAO’s case, the interlinkages have been infrequently discussed 
within their reporting since the early 2010s with a noticeable increase in emphasis from 2017 
onwards. In the 2017 report “Sowing the seeds of peace for food security: Disentangling the 
nexus between conflict, food security and peace”, FAO highlighted that “climate-related 
events, especially droughts, tend to affect food availability and access, exacerbating the risk 
of conflict in such contexts”( FAO, 2017, p.3). Later on, the 2018 Crop Prospects and Food 
Situation Report continued along similar lines, stating that: “persistent conflicts and climate-
related shocks are currently driving high levels of severe food insecurity, particularly in 
Southern African and Near East countries, which continue to require humanitarian 
assistance…” (FAO, 2018a). Furthermore, during the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize Forum, FAO’s 
then Director-General, José Graziana da Silva, also underlined that the levels of conflict and 
hunger were to rise if the impacts of climate change would continue to be ignored. He also 
concluded that: ”when climate change promotes conflict, such as over access to increasingly-
scarce land and water resources, it further promotes food insecurity” (FAO, 2018b). 
Similarly, the State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World report (FAO et al., 2018) also 
highlighted that the increase in global hunger that year was largely due to climate related 
shocks and the increased amount of violent conflict. 
 
FAO’s approach to the interlinkages also relies heavily on the notion of human security, 
emphasising particularly the severity of the impacts of food insecurity among the most 
vulnerable populations around the world (FAO, 2018a). The agency also emphasises the 
importance of resilience building within its discursive approach. Climate change forms a 
corner stone of FAO’s work: agriculture should be ”promoted through the implementation of 
climate-smart approaches, practices and techniques that also preserve the environment and 
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biodiversity, and adaptation must help build the resilience of millions of poor family farmers” 
(FAO, 2020).  
 
The United Nations Development Programme 
 
UNPD identifies “conflict prevention, climate change mitigation and adaption” (Modéer, 
2019) as central parts for their mission in achieving long-term sustainable development. 
Climate-related security risks are seen to undermine the efforts to reach the 2030 Agenda 
Global for Sustainable Development, which is why “supporting climate security” is an 
important part of their mandate. UNDP identified that: 
 
While climate change does not cause violent conflict, in and of itself, it can 
through its interaction with other social, political and economic factors have 
negative impacts on international peace and security. The pathways through 
which these risks manifest is highly contextual and determined by the 
interaction between climatic hazards, exposure, and, most importantly, the 
vulnerability and coping capacity of states and societies. The risks are 
greatest where institutions and communities are unable to cope with the stress 
or absorb the shock and can lead to downward spirals when critical 
thresholds are exceeded and adaptive capacity compromised.  These risks 
have already become a reality for millions of people around the world. 
(UNDP, 2020a) 
 
UNDP also recognises that whilst the issues of climate and conflict are nothing new, their 
interlinkages are still not comprehensively understood. Thus, the issues regarding climate 
change and conflict require a multi-dimensional approach in order to find truly sustainable 
solutions. Factors such as recognition effective governance, equitable and fair management 
of natural resources, resilience building and availability of alternative climate-resilient 
livelihoods are important parts within this approach. Moreover, the agency (UNDP, 2020a) 
also underlines its aim to ultimately “facilitate a systematic shift from crisis response to 
coordinated risk prevention, early warning and effective adaptation” (p.1).  
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Overall, there are two common factors present in all of the examined UN actors’ 
organisational discourses, which should be taken into consideration. Firstly, all the examined 
actors generally ‘set the stage’ in a fairly limited fashion: the specific contexts where the 
interlinkages between climate change and conflict are addressed focus almost exclusively on 
the developing world, and in particular, the African continent. This is done even though 
examples of interlinkages are also found from the developed world. One good example of a 
situation where environmental change has influenced the creation of conflict would the city 
of New Orleans, US, after the hurricane Katrina in 2005. Devastated by natural disaster, the 
city experienced widespread of class and race induced violence in the aftermaths of Katrina 
(Arsel, 2011, p. 452). However, these types of examples were missing from the UN reports. 
Secondly, all the actors construct their arguments regarding the interlinkages between climate 
change and conflict in an apolitical and, at times, vague manner. A comprehensive and 
nuanced discussion about the role of e.g. international corporations or the responsibility of 
developed countries for several environmentally driven and the politicised operations are 
completely missing. In the words of Arsel (2011) describing the UNEP policy paper ‘From 
Conflict to Peace: the role of Natural Resources and the Environment’: “Rather than 
unpacking how the various groups and their interests are constituted as part of broader 
political economic processes, the report instead takes these tensions for granted and feeds 
them into the deterministic understanding that purports to be apolitical” (p. 455). Even 
though, the UN actors mention the importance of e.g. socioeconomic and political factors 
within their reports an emphasise the importance of a comprehensive approach in 
understanding the interlinkages, they do not discuss these in great detail or through concrete 
examples. It seems as if the agencies are shying away from showcasing some of the more 
politicised factors; most likely because highlighting those would require calling out the 
harmful actions of the more powerful actors. However, one key component in making sense 
of the interlinkages lies in the understanding that the main role is not necessarily played by 
climate change or conflict themselves, but rather the prevailing socioeconomic and political 
structures that they exist in, which are constructed and maintained in the interest of those in 
power (Arsel, 2011). Choosing not to explicitly underline this, can also be considered an act 
of power by the UN. In conclusion, even though all the examined agencies find the issues of 
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climate change and conflict important with their own interpretations, if the UN actors opt to 
only show one side of a particular situation within their evaluation and guidance, they are 
simultaneously aiding the creation of one-sided, and ultimately faulty, solutions to the issues 
they are so eagerly attempting to solve.   
  
Chapter 3: Methodological Tools for Analysis  
 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of the methodological framework of the study and 
explains why Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is the most suitable method to help answer 
the research question under investigation. The first section discusses the process of data 
collection, which is followed by the introduction of methodological framework. This entails 
a deeper look into CDA as a methodology as well as a run-
through Norman Fairclough’s three dimensions theory, which is used to conduct the 
research. Lastly, the final sections discuss the potential limitations of the study in addition to 
shedding light on ethical considerations and positionality regarding the research.    
 
3.1. Data Collection  
   
Most of the data collection process was conducted between March 2020 and May 2020. The 
aim of the data collection was to find material, which dealt with the issues of climate change 
in the context of the South Sudanese conflict. The final dataset consists of fifteen sources to 
be analysed in depth, which turned out to be a lot less than anticipated. The data consists of 
reports, briefs, studies, blogposts, story articles and news articles produced under the name of 
the four UN actors in question. The majority of documents were news articles, press releases, 
blogposts or story articles (10). The rest of the documents represented either reports (2), report 
summaries (1), working papers (1) or briefs (1). The page numbers of the documents ranged 
from 3-46 pages. All the documents were all produced and published between 2011 (the 
independence of South Sudan) and May 2020. Due to time and length constrains, the data was 
narrowed down by the number of UN actors and the availability of sources. The four chosen 
UN actors represent relevant and active actors in the conflict in South Sudan, with mandates 
that identify climate change as a key operational obstacle. Furthermore, all of the examined 
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UN actors also work closely on developmental issues related to the implications of climate 
change: (UNEP – climate smart environmental development, FAO – climate smart 
agriculture, WFP – food security through climate resilience, UNDP – sustainable 
development goals/climate action). The number of documents from each actor was 
determined first and foremost by availability, yet the balance between the actors 
remained stable. The dataset consisted of five documents from FAO, four from UNEP, four 
from WFP and two from UNDP.      
 
The data was collected from publicly available sources from the internet. These included 
mainly the examined UN actors’ main websites. The relevant information was often found 
from the relevant websites under the section on South Sudan. In addition to the actors’ 
websites, which included often large amounts of information, I also used the search engine at 
Reliefweb.int to find more relevant sources. Reliefweb.int is the largest humanitarian 
information portal in world, and it is administered by the United Nations office for the 
Coordination of humanitarian affairs (OCHA). In order for the sources to be considered 
relevant for the study, they had to discuss the particular situation in South Sudan (keyword: 
“South Sudan”) and include the keyword “climate change” in addition to synonyms, 
derivatives and other phrases implying similar meanings. These included keywords such as 
“drought”, “flood”, “environmental degradation” and “resource scarcity”. To expand the 
search, the following additional keywords were used to discover more sources of data: 
“conflict”, “climate-conflict”, “insecurity”, “security” and “vulnerability”. Furthermore, I 
also used the names of the examined actors to limit the search and eliminate unnecessary 
sources of data.  
 
 3.2. The research processes  
3.2.1. Critical Discourse Analysis Approach (CDA)  
Critical discourse analysis is a contemporary approach to the study of language and 
discourses in social institutions. Drawing on poststructuralist discourse theory and 
critical linguistics, it focuses on how social relations, identity, knowledge and power 
are constructed through written and spoken texts in communities (Luke, 1997, p. 50)  
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Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) is both a theory and a method, which views 
the use of language as a form of social practise. It represents an interdisciplinary approach to 
study of discourse, stemming from critical theory of language (Janks, 1997). CDA focusses 
on examining how societal power relations are realised and reinforced through the use of 
language. Hence, it differentiates from discourse analysis by the aim of unveiling issues of 
exploitation, power asymmetries and structural inequalities through its analysis (Blommaertt 
and Bucean, 2000).   CDA was chosen as the methodology for the thesis in question, due to 
its critical stance, which could help reveal issues from UN discourse, which could otherwise 
go unnoticed. 
 
CDA as a theory is hard to define, because it includes various different approaches, which 
can be utilised in many different disciplines from humanities and social sciences to linguistics. 
Rogers et al. (2005) emphasises that critical theories are usually concerned with issues of 
justice and power in addition to the ways in which factors such as class, gender, religion, 
economy, race, and education produce or transform social systems. In Wodak and Mayer’s 
(2009) opinion, CDA stresses the need for interdisciplinary analysis in order to develop a 
“proper understanding of how language functions in constituting and transmitting knowledge 
in organising social institutions” (in Mogashoa, 2014, p. 105). Van Dijk (2006) argues that 
CDA is primarily motivated by the at attempt to make sense of pressing social issues (p.252). 
For Norman Fairclough (2001a), CDA “aims to show non-obvious ways in which language 
is involved in social relations of power and domination, and in ideology” (p.229). It focusses 
on not only describing discursive practices but also on shedding light on the constructive 
effect discourse may have upon social relations, social identities and systems of knowledge 
and belief (Fairclough, 1992, p. 12). 
 
Two of the main concepts of CDA are ideology and power, which is why its key functions 
relies in “unmasking ideologies” and “revealing structures of power” (Wodak and Meyer, 
2009, p. 8). In political science, ideology is defined as “a coherent and relatively stable set of 
beliefs or values” (ibid.). However, the ideology that CDA refers to differs from that of 
political science, as it is firmly linked to everyday beliefs and dominant ideologies that come 
across as “neutral” (ibid.), simultaneously legitimating potential dominance or even power 
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abuse (van Dijk, 2009, p. 78). Van Dijk (2009) defines ideologies as “the fundamental social 
beliefs that organise and control the social representations of groups and their members” (p. 
78-79). The issue with dominant ideologies is that they usually exist widely unchallenged and 
thus appear “neutral”. This can be problematic from an analytical as well as human point of 
view as it may cause individuals to think alike and to disregard the potential surrounding 
alternatives (Wodak and Mayer, 2009, p. 8). We can become blind to the ways in which 
language constructs our social realities. According to Parker (1992): “language is so 
structured to mirror power relations that often we can see no other ways of being, and it 
structures ideology so that it is difficult to speak both in and against it” (p. xi).  As the UN is 
considered a powerful text producer with wide readership, it is important to examine further 
the kind of ideologies the UN actors are producing through their discourses, as they may 
eventually, if not already, as everyday beliefs and become ‘the norm’ that shapes opinions, 
actions, and even policy. 
 
The other important concept in CDA, which also has a close link to ideology, is power. CDA 
is particularly interested in analysing the speech acts of those in power. It focusses on studying 
how the powerful actors utilise language to produce or reproduce domination (Wodak and 
Meyer, 2009, p.2). Language has become one of the key means to uphold social control and 
power. As Fairclough (2001) points out, the exercise of power through “ideological working 
of language” has become increasingly successful (p.2).  
 
Ultimately, CDA attempts to bridge textual analysis of language with the analysis of social 
practise (Van Dijk, 1998).  Ultimately it examines the relationship between language, text and 
social structures. It is well suited for the purpose of this study as it is very textually orientated, 
rather than focusing on engaging and discussing discourse in a more abstract manner. All the 
material used for the thesis are UN documents. Furthermore, CDA’s criticality in studying 
the language and social practice helps the thesis to beyond surface of the discourse and truly 
understand their meanings and implication better. As mentioned earlier, there are several 
different methodologies for carrying out CDA (Lillis and McKinney, 2003; Wodak and 
Meyer, 2009), yet this research will focus on Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional model, 
which will be further explained in the following section. 
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3.2.2. Norman Fairclough’s CDA: the three-dimensions model  
 
Norman Fairclough’s (1989; 1992; 2003) three-dimensional framework will be used as the 
guiding method for the analysis. According to Fairclough, analysis of text can never be done 
in isolation from the wider social context. Thus, all communicative events comprise of three 
dimensions: The first one is a textual dimension (descriptive level), which can involve speech, 
writing and/or visual images. The second one is discursive practise (interpretative level), 
which includes the production and consumption of text. The last dimension deals with social 
practice (explicatory level). The following sections will explain the dimensions in more 
detail.  
 
First dimension: textual analysis (the descriptive level)  
 
The first dimension entails a linguistic analysis, which aims to examine how discourses are 
textually realised, and how their construction supports specific interpretations of issues 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). In this thesis, the textual analysis of the UN documents in 
question allows us to understand better how e.g. different power relations or ideologies within 
UN discourses on climate change and conflict are linguistically produced. Fairclough’s 
(1992) theory identifies some analytical topics, which will be used later on to analyse the 
textual dimension of the data. These topics are mainly concerned with the ideational function 
of the language, meaning how the UN discourses linguistically contribute to the construction 
of the social reality.  The topics are cohesion (connectives and argumentation), grammar 
(transitivity and modality) and vocabulary (word meaning and wording). The analysis of 
cohesion is concerned with identifying certain types of narratives and argumentation. In this 
study, it means identifying how the relationship between climate change and conflict has been 
constructed. The analysis of transitivity deals with questions of agency, causality and 
responsibility (Fairclough, 1992). It is particularly useful for the investigation of the 
relationship between human action and climate change: how is the relationship portrayed and 
what kind of ideological and structural effects could it entail? In regard to responsibility, the 
most interesting and valuable aspect to examine is how cause and outcome are expressed in 
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the text. In other words, who gets the blame. The analysis of modality examines the degree 
of affinity that is expressed through the text. In this study, this was done through investigating 
whether the documents present their information as absolute truths, or if they leave room for 
alternative or competing interpretations. Lastly, the analysis of the vocabulary allows us to 
critically examine how certain key words are utilised and what type meanings and/or 
ideologies do they convey. In this thesis, the analysis focusses on the meaning behind the 
words conflict, climate change and security.  
 
The second dimension: analysis of discourse practice (the interpretive part)  
 
Discursive practices entail the processes of text production, distribution and 
consumption. The second dimension thus focusses on analysing the relationship between the 
text and the order of discourse. Furthermore, it attempts to tackle the issue of what discursive 
practices are drawn upon within the texts and how they are expressed together (Fairclough, 
1992/1995). This is an important part of the study as it tackles the question of what discourses 
regarding climate change and conflict are drawn upon and how they are articulated and 
combined within the UN documents. The tools used to conduct the analysis of discursive 
practice are the analysis of intertextuality and interdiscursivity as well as the analysis of 
intertextual chains (Fairclough, 1992). Due to the nature of the study, I will not be focussing 
explicitly on questions of consumption. The analysis of intertextuality focusses mainly on 
what previous texts are the documents referring to and in which ways. On the other hand, the 
analysis of interdiscursivity is concerned with what type of discourses are present in the text 
and how are they combined. For example, a useful way to move forward with these is to 
investigate the various configurations of discourses regarding climate change and conflict, 
which simultaneously indicate how the issue is perceived. Furthermore, another useful point 
of enquiry could be to investigate what previous texts are explicitly or implicitly highlighted 
in the documents and pinpoint their producers in addition to the institutional position they 
hold. Regarding the distribution, the analysis of intertextual chains will examine the 
transformation of UN documents into e.g. media texts, academic articles, report etc. The 
transformation process usually results into the incorporation of different elements to text 
which can then form new mixes and meanings (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).  
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The third dimension: analysis of social practise (the explicatory part)  
 
This level is primarily concerned with concepts of ideology and power. The analytical 
objective of the level is to examine how the discursive practises are shaped by wider social 
practises and realities, as well as to scrutinise the effects discursive practise may have on 
social practise. This thesis will focus particularly on the institutional, situational and financial 
realities that shape the construction of the UN discourse. In addition, it is also important to 
understand what effects the discourses have on the construction and constitution of social 
relations, identities, and systems of belief and knowledge (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; 
Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002).  
   
3.3. Limitations to study  
  
The first limitation to my research is represented by the amount of data as well as the time 
constrains. The data gathered on UN discourses is very limited due to short independent 
history, and thus relatively short period of UN activities in the state. In addition, there was 
not much information to begin with and due to time- and length constrains, I was only able to 
include data that fulfilled the earlier described conditions. The fact that the data was narrowed 
down to only consider South Sudan could also be problematic, as there could be discrepancies 
in the results, if analysed. However, by conducting a case-study based analysis, the thesis 
aimed to do its part in filling the gap in the research, which was highlighted to be the low 
level of case-specific empirical research regarding the interlinkages on climate change and 
conflict. In addition, as both climate change and conflict are highly temporally- and spatially 
dependent phenomena, the research should in all cases be limited to smaller areas, such as 
countries, regions, cities or even communities, depending on the amount of available data.  
In addition, the chosen methodology also limits the scope of the research. One limitation of CDA is 
that meanings are never actually fixed, meaning that everything is always open for differing 
interpretations and even negotiation (Morgan, 2010). Another potential limitation and also one most 
common criticism direct at CDA, is that is relies heavily on the insight of the researcher (e.g. 
Widdowson, 1995a/1995b). Thus, the biggest concern is whether the researcher is able to separate 
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his or her own opinions or beliefs from influencing the process (Litosseliti, 2006, p. 54). Moreover, 
the fact that CDA focusses greatly on the results, whilst paying little attention to the methodological 
process that guide the process, has not alleviated such concerns over potential research bias.  
Moreover, the fact that CDA offers many different perspectives and methodological perspectives for 
the study of language and social practise can be overwhelming to any researcher. This can also be 
considered a potential limitation if research techniques are not focussed and narrowed down 
appropriately to fit research question. In terms of representativeness of critical discourse analysis, the 
length of selected texts can hinder and limit the results of the analysis (Schegloff, 1997; Sharrock and 
Anderson, 1981; Stubbs, 1997; Verschueren, 2001; Wetherell, 1998). Understanding and 
acknowledging of these potential limitations, the thesis advances to conduct the analysis after 
highlighting some further ethical considerations and issues regarding the researchers own 
positionality within the research process.  
3.4. Ethical Considerations and positionality  
   
The section highlights ethical considerations regarding the topic and the research process as 
well as my own bias towards the thesis. It will also touch upon the concept 
of positionality. All these factors are crucial parts of any research process. First, I must 
consider my personal incentives regarding the topic and why I have chosen it in the first 
place. The reason as to why I chose to study the interlinkages of climate change and conflict 
in a faraway African country rather than focussing issues closer to home was purely out of 
interest. There was also more material (read: UN documents) available on climate change and 
conflict regarding the Southern hemisphere rather than e.g. Scandinavia, which 
in hindsight represents a certain bias of its own. Nevertheless, the matter of availability 
together with my personal interest on South Sudan consciously guided my decision regarding 
the topic. Furthermore, it is important to note that I have never actually visited South Sudan 
or any other African countries, which makes me reliant on second-hand knowledge through 
literature and media as well perceptions in understanding the situation. The study of UN 
discourses on climate change and conflict in the context of South Sudan itself is 
not considered a sensitive topic as the focus is on language and discourses and their meanings 
rather than on individuals. The decision to focus specifically on South Sudan was made due 
to personal interest. Furthermore, through the case study, the thesis aimed to shed light 
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on South Sudan’s particular situation, rather than generalising the discourses on climate 
change and conflict to consider the whole “African continent”. As the theoretical framework 
highlighted, such generalisation could in worst case scenario lead to e.g. incorrect policy-
planning.  
  
As mentioned earlier, my research did not include any participants, but rather focussed on 
looking at discourses and language in their social contexts, meaning that the risk of non-
maleficence within the research process was low. All the data used in analysis was also 
publicly available for anyone to use. However, there is one major ethical issue, which needs 
to be considered in using CDA as the methodology. This is the potential of misrepresentation. 
As a researcher, I need to be very conscious of not cherry-picking the discourses and social 
interactions from the text that would only support my set hypothesis. This particularly crucial 
in presenting evidence via quotations. Highlighting only certain parts of text can easily twist 
or even falsify the original meanings. Thus, I have to analyse the texts as a whole with all its 
nuances.  
 
 Furthermore, I also need to consider how my previous experience have affected my research. 
Firstly, my experience working with the Permanent Mission of Finland in Geneva, where I 
participated to several UN agency briefings, has also shaped my understanding on how the 
whole UN system functions. Due to the amount of diplomatic balancing required to 
accomplish any type of collective outcomes, my understanding of the UN actors’ ability react 
to situations was not very optimistic to begin with. I also must take into consideration that I 
was introduced to the conflict in South Sudan from a security orientated point of view during 
a course called ‘Responsibility to Protect and Prosecute’ during my undergraduate studies at 
the University of Leeds and even wrote an essay about principles of ‘responsibility to 
protect’ in the context of South Sudan. Thus, I have to be cautious of my own subconscious 
biases, which have been installed in me through my studies, and make sure my 
observations within my research remain impartial. Impartiality is crucial for any research 
project. Any conclusion drawn from literature or the data must truly be drawn from the 
existing evidence, rather than letting the researcher’s own predispositions guide the research 
process.   
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Moreover, my positionality as a white Finnish female researcher has most likely affected my 
perspective on the topic, and moreover how the topic is approached within my 
analysis. Considering the dominance of the global North in gathering and producing academic 
knowledge, it is important to understand how my work contributes to these existing power 
structures.  My personal academic background includes peace and conflict studies in the 
Finnish context as well as security politics and international relations in British context. Both 
experiences have shaped my understanding of the world and particularly social 
sciences. Thus, I must also acknowledge how heavily my academic background has focussed 
on explaining issues through the so-called Western lens of social sciences, which emphasises 
the European and American contexts. However, I attempted to counter some 
of these biases rising from my own positionality by using CDA as method for the analysis.   
 
Chapter 4: Analysis  
    
Chapter 4 will examine how the four UN actors (UNEP, FAO, WFP and UNDP) have 
presented and conceptualised the relation between climate change and conflict in the context 
of South Sudan. Thus, the analysis will be conducted by comparing the collected data against 
the set hypotheses that were drawn from the theoretical framework. In order to understand 
what discourses surrounding climate and conflict are utilised and how they are being 
articulated, the findings will be further examined with the methodological tools identified in 
Chapter 3.  The first part of the chapter highlights the different discourses prevalent in the 
assessed documents.   
   
The analysis discovered that the discourses used in the UN documents are overlapping in 
many ways. One document could contain several different conceptualisations of the relation 
between climate change and conflict, which at times hindered the overall effectiveness of the 
message. In addition, it is worth mentioning that six of the fifteen documents did not contain 
any type of conceptualisation of the relation between climate change and conflict. 
Nevertheless, the following sections will discuss the conceptualisations that were present, and 
how well they reflected the set hypothesis. 
   
 50 
4.1. How do UN discourses on South Sudan reflect what we know about the links 
between conflicts and climate change?   
  
The argumentation suggesting a link between climate change and conflict, through 
environmental degradation (the first hypothesis), could only be found from one source, 
which were the UNEP Brief (Gilruth, 2019). The link was described to be a two-way stream: 
climate-induced environmental degradation could contribute to the eruption of conflict, yet 
simultaneously conflict could also degrade the natural environment and exacerbate climate 
change.   
  
The key message for this brief is that conflict degrades the environment and 
environmental degradation can be a driver of conflicts. When climate change 
accelerates environmental degradation, the risk of conflict increases. This 
feedback loop is demonstrated in the case of South Sudan (p.1).   
 
In the brief, climate-exacerbated environmental degradation is conceptualised to lead to 
resource scarcity and forced migration, which consequently could increase the frequency of 
violence in South Sudan through e.g. cattle raiding. The argumentation highlighted the need 
for a better understanding of the interconnections between environmental factors and security, 
in the light of intensifying climate change. However, the discursive construction is done in 
rather cautious terms by avoiding the use of any deterministic tones. Climate change was 
described as merely an accelerator, which could increase the risk of conflict among other 
factors. The text also identified other factors, as the flow of small weapons, to increase the 
levels of violence.  
 
Further on, the text also highlighted the vastness and complexity of the interconnection 
between climate change, environment and conflict by discussing the multiple factors, which 
allow a feedback loop to persist. Such factors were described to be e.g. oil, biodiversity, 
migration, urbanisation, forestry and agriculture. The argumentation demonstrated medium 
levels of modality. The text presented their findings regarding the interrelations as legitimate 
and urgent, emphasising the following: “the international community engaged in 
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implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) must understand these 
interconnections between environment and security in view of the onset of climate change” 
(Gilruth, 2019). However, the argumentation supporting hypothesis 1 forms only one part 
within the entire discursive construction of the text.  
   
The argumentation suggesting that climate-induced resource scarcity could lead to the 
eruption of conflict (the second hypothesis) was encountered in six documents. Most of the 
documents found climate change induced drier weather patterns to be an underlying driver 
for resource-based conflicts between the South Sudanese pastoralists and the farming 
communities over access to grazing land (WFP, 2017b; UNDP, 2017a; UNDP, 2017b; UNEP, 
2017). Resource scarcity was also portrayed be the consequence of climate-induced 
environmental degradation (UNEP Brief/ Gilruth, 2019), which consequently resulted into 
more cattle raiding and/or conflict. UNEP’s (2017) press release highlighted the most drastic 
language by referencing South Sudan’s previous Environment Minister Deng Deng Hoc Yai 
who stated that climatic changes (e.g. drought) put pressure on resources which consequently 
then “fan the flames of conflict”. It also emphasised access to water and loss of grazing land 
to be triggering factors for violence. Interestingly, other contributing political or 
socioeconomic factors were only mentioned within two of the six documents (WFP, 2017b; 
UNEP 2018a). WFP’s (Sova, 2017b) blogpost was one of the only texts highlighting ethno-
religious factors in discussing the situation regarding climate change and conflict. Even 
though the text of the quote is referring to Darfur conflict in Sudan, the overall text does 
further on emphasise how these same highlighted tensions are also playing out in South 
Sudan: 
 
These long-term climatic trends have had significant consequences for Sudan’s 
two predominant – and sometimes competing – agricultural systems: 
Smallholder farmers relying on rain-fed production and nomadic pastoralists. 
Agriculturalist in Sudan are predominantly ethno-African, while pastoralists are 
disproportionately of Arab ethnicity. Fast-moving desertification and drought 
slowly eroded the availability of natural resources to support livelihoods and 
peaceful coexistence of these two groups in the region (Sova, 2017b) 
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Six documents included argumentation suggesting the increased climate-induced 
vulnerability to be a severe threat to human security (the third hypothesis) (FAO, 2020; 
UNEP, 2018a; Gilruth, 2019; Sova, 2017b; WFP, 2019; UNDP, 2017b). Climate change was 
portrayed to have a devastating impact, not only on natural systems, but also to human and 
social systems, as the combination of on-going civil war and extreme weather events are seen 
as the main cause for increased food and livelihood livelihood. WFP’s (Sova, 2017b) blogpost 
underlined the following: 
  
The combined effects of civil war and drought have left nearly 5 million people 
food-insecure in the country (South Sudan), representing over 40 percent of the 
population. (WFP, 2017b, p. 2) 
 
Furthermore, UNEP’s brief (Gilruth, 2019) highlighted that despite the increasing knowledge 
on the effects of climate change, its implications for human security and the rise of conflict 
are yet to be fully understood. 
 
The argumentation concerning the conceptualisation of climate change as a threat 
multiplier (the fourth hypothesis) could be found in three documents (Gilruth, 2019; UNEP, 
2018a; UNDP, 2017). This was surprising considering how dominant the ‘threat multiplier’ 
discourse has been within the political discourses.  UNEP’s (Gilruth, 2019) brief emphasised 
that: 
  
The current consensus is that climate change alone is unlikely to be the primary 
cause of conflict, but it is an important threat multiplier. As such, climate 
change has been identified as a threat multiplier, which can exacerbate existing 
threats. (p. 1)  
   
Similar argumentation was used in an example in UNDP’s (2017a, p. 2) blogpost, which 
constructed climate change as a potential threat multiplier in South Sudan that could 
exacerbate tensions and conflict, similarly to how it has done in Lake Chad region, if 
something was not done about it.  
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As the world gears up to confront the threats posed by climate change and 
support communities most affected, South Sudan faces a grave risk of being left 
behind despite being a signatory to the Paris Agreement. Mounting evidence 
across countries and regions show inaction now can have long term and 
potentially irreversible consequences. A case in point is the Lake Chad 
region which in relatively short span of fifty years has shrunk from an area of 
25,000 square kilometres to 2,500 square kilometres, affecting nearly 50 million 
people and turned into a ‘threat multiplier’ by exacerbating tensions and 
conflicts in the communities that live there.   
   
As already mentioned, the most deterministic nuances were represented in UNEP’s news 
article (2017), which referenced e.g. South Sudan’s former Environment Minister, 
Deng Deng Hoc Yai’s statements, in which he claimed climate change to have exacerbated 
the civil war in South Sudan, as well as a report by Germany’s International public 
broadcasting company Deutsche Welle, which highlighted how “many experts believe the 
changing climate is partly responsible for South Sudan’s three-year old internal armed 
conflict” (UNEP, 2017). Both of these references were used to legitimise the discursive 
contraction of climate change as a potential threat-multiplier.  
   
The argumentation highlighting other political and socioeconomic factors within their 
conceptualisation of the relation between climate change and conflict (the fifth 
hypothesis) could only be identified in four documents (WFP, 2014; FAO, 2016b; FAO, 
2017; UNEP, 2018b). Despite identifying some political and socioeconomic factors, such as 
governmental actions and effective distribution as issues for the peaceful development of the 
country (e.g. news article by FAO, 2017), ultimately the UN actors used very little effort to 
further explain these factors and their impacts within their discursive construction. In majority 
of cases they were only included in a list form within the text.  
 
The intensifying impacts of climate change and the difficult socioeconomic realities were 
described to “form a complex dynamic of causes contributing to environmental change in 
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South Sudan” in the UNEP Report (2018b, p. 12). Moreover, the political and socioeconomic 
factors, present in South Sudan, were described to increase the society’s vulnerability to the 
natural hazards, such as floods and droughts, whose duration, frequency and intensity were 
exacerbated by climate change (UNEP, 2018b). Moreover, the following political and 
socioeconomic stressors were also identified:  
  
Socioeconomic factors and dynamics, such as economics, demographics, 
technology, cultural norms, governance and conflict, are the root causes that 
drive physical pressures on the environment. Pressures range from extractive 
and land use activities such as forestry, agriculture, to fishing and mining 
(UNEP, 2018b, p.9). 
   
Furthermore, the same report (UNEP, 2018b)  also identified  various other drivers of conflict 
such as “the proliferation of small arms, the politicisation of ethnicity, a legacy of weak 
property rights, the lack of economic diversification and over-reliance on oil”( p.9),  in 
addition to “the influx of refugees, returnees and internally displaced people since 2005”, 
which have “also been a significant cause of inappropriate land use and over-exploitation of 
natural resources” (p. 9 )  
 
FAO’s (2016b) report identified South Sudan to be one of the most violence prone states in 
the world, sitting at sixth place in the global rankings of conflict events. ”Most of these 
conflicts are associated with issue related to governance, but also with natural resources” 
(FAO, 2016b, p.35). However, the text did not go into further explaining, what types of issues 
it referred to, leaving the discursive construction weak. Furthermore, even though WFP’s 
(2014) report identified some type of a link between the impacts of climate change and 
conflict, it was the only report emphasising that conflicts in South Sudan to be first and 
foremost political:  
   
Climate impacts have also a bearing on conflicts, but this has not been included 
in this report, given that the major conflicts being faced in the country is political 
(p. 2). 
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The discursive construction emphasising the need to build resilience (the sixth 
hypothesis) was not widely present in the UN’s discursive construction of climate change 
and conflict in the context of South Sudan. Three of the examined documents (UNDP, 2017a; 
UNDP, 2017b; FAO, 2017) mention the need to build more diversified livelihoods and 
increase the nation’s resilience within their discursive construction. UNDP’s (2017a) blogpost 
emphasised the importance of long-term solutions focussing on resilience and cooperation, 
particularly in terms South Sudan’s agricultural practices:   
 
Strengthening domestic preparedness on climate change adaptation and 
investing in climate resilient agriculture will be a concrete step towards building 
resilient communities. The challenges faced in South Sudan call for a new way 
of working by striking a better balance acting simultaneously on lifesaving, 
recovery and resilience-building fronts. (p. 2)  
  
FAO’s (2017) news article emphasised the need to build resilience and take mitigative action 
for both situation of conflict and the intensifying effects of climate change. The need to 
”support an agenda of climate change adaptation and building diversified livelihoods in 
South Sudan” (Press release - UNDP, 2017b) was also brought forward in the discursive 
construction, emphasising the need for long-term solution that focus on resilience in 
understanding the relationship between climate change and conflict. Overall, the discursive 
construction regarding resilience placed a lot of responsibility on the back of the international 
community, in terms of enabling the needed resilience building in South Sudan. UNDP’s 
(2017a) blogpost emphasised that:  
  
The country needs a bold and ambitious international response, including access 
to new, adequate and sustained source of climate change finance and clean 
technology. While a good start, the needs far outstrip the resources available 
within the Global Environmental Facility and the Green Climate Fund.  (p. 2)   
    
Any argumentation regarding discourses on cooperation (also part of the sixth 
hypothesis) could not be found from the data.  
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4.2. Critical examination of the Discourses: Fairclough’s Three-Dimensional Theory  
  
The following section will attempt elaborate on the finding drawn from UN documents by 
critically examining them with the help of Fairclough’s (1992, 1995) three-dimensional 
analytical model’s principles. First, the analysis begins with a more detailed textual analysis 
of the findings. This is then followed by an analysis of the discursive practice. The 
final section focusses on reflecting upon the social, institutional and situational realities in 
which the examined UN actors have discussed the interlinkages between climate change and 
conflict.  
 
4.2.1. Textual analysis  
 
The textual analysis will focus on locating the language used to portray the discourses drawn 
from UN documents, which helps us to understand how the discourses regarding the 
interlinkages between climate change and conflict are linguistically realised. Drawing upon 
Fairclough’s methodological framework, the first section focusses on the analysis 
of cohesion, which is the inquiry of argumentation regarding the construction of the relation 
between climate change and conflict within the texts.  Many of the documents combined 
different discursive branches within their conceptualisation, creating several ‘hybrid-
discourses’. This implies a combination of several argumentation types, which are mixed and 
match to construct the wanted discursive make-up. For example, the UNEP brief (Gilruth, 
2019) combined four of the outlined six hypothetical discourses within its discursive 
construction, whereas the WFP (2014) report only highlighted one. The discursive make-ups 
of the documents are not only different between the four agencies but also within the agencies 
as well. Therefore, it is impossible to establish any overarching and comprehensive patterns 
regarding how the UN actors construct their discourses. However, the two most common 
types of argumentations regarding the relation between climate change and conflict in the 
context of South Sudan were hybrid-discourses. The first one portrays a relationship where 
climate change fuels conflict over grazing areas between pastoralists and farmers (UNDP, 
2017a; UNDP, 2017b; UNEP, 2019; UNEP, 2017), which represents mixture of discourses 
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emphasising environmental degradation and resource scarcity. The second type of 
argumentation portrays the relationship as follows: increasing challenges posed by climate 
change are exacerbated by the on-going conflict, which then pose a risk to human security, 
mainly through hindering food security (UNEP, 2018a; FAO, 2017; FAO, 2018; FAO, 2020; 
Phiri, 2019). It is important to acknowledge that these were not the only argumentation 
present, even though they are considered the most common ones within the dataset. When 
looking separately at each agencies’ documents in the context of South Sudan, one can 
actually identify some over-arching aspects with the organisation level argumentation. 
UNEP’s discursive construction did contain the most security driven tones. WFP and FAO 
both focussed the first and foremost the importance of food security in understanding the 
interlinkages and UNDP was the main agency emphasising the aspects of resilience. Thus, on 
this level there seems to be some correlation. However, overall the discourses did not follow 
any ‘coherent blueprint’, and as mentioned, several discursive discrepancies can be identified 
between and within these UN documents. It must be also emphasised that six of the 
documents did not discuss the interrelation between climate change and conflict at all. Rather, 
they focussed on explaining the effects both phenomena have in South Sudan separately, 
which was the most common among FAO’s documents. 
 
The study of transitivity focussed on looking at questions 
of agency, causality and responsibility within the UN discourses.  In terms of agency, the 
study found that majority of the UN documents understood climate change as being largely 
the result of human action. For example, UNEP (Gilruth, 2019) underlined that issues, such 
as oil extradition, deforestation (due to forestry and agriculture) as well as pollution caused 
by increasing urbanisation, were some of ways human action contributes to the increasing 
effect of climate change in South Sudan. These issues were also exacerbated by conflict 
situations. The level of responsibility that was placed on South Sudan’s human agency overall 
was low. It did however vary between the documents, as some highlighted the effects of the 
lack of good governance (FAO, 2017; UNEP, 2018a) or the earlier mentioned human 
activities, such oil extradition and charcoal production to bear responsibility (Gilruth, 2019), 
whilst other did not shed light on the responsibility of South Sudanese agency at all. 
Furthermore, the argumentation, which victimised South Sudan, emphasising how the country 
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is not actually contributing to global warming through e.g. emissions, yet simultaneously it is 
suffering from its consequences, could also be identified (UNDP, 2017a). The argumentation 
describing the agency of the UN or the international community as contributors to climate 
change was silenced.      
  
In terms of causality, some of the discursive practises portrayed climate change to be the 
main contributing agent within the interrelation between climate change and conflict, which 
can be problematic. By presenting climate change as a natural threat that exacerbates conflict 
in South Sudan, the discursive construction conceals the huge responsibility of the North 
for the generation of CO2 and greenhouse gas emissions. The developed world has 
historically produced more emissions than the developing countries, which has also aided 
their development by e.g. cheaper transition to industrialisation (UNFCC, 1992; Rocha et al., 
2015). Thus, they should bear the responsibility in addressing the negative impacts of climate 
change.  However, this type of emphasis on climate justice and fair 
distribution of responsibility are hardly ever seriously discussed in the dominant discourses 
due to the difficult political nature of the issue and the opposite understanding of 
responsibility and culpability particularly between the global North and South (Whalley and 
Walsh, 2009). The lack of attention given to issues regarding historical injustices, in addition 
to silencing the marginalised voices within the discursive practices become problematic as 
they enable the neo-colonial structures of power to be linguistically realised without any 
opposition. Only one document, WFP’s blogpost (Phiri, 2019), highlighted the low level of 
responsibility that South Sudan bears in contributing to climate change, whilst simultaneously 
suffering from its consequences greatly.  
 
Furthermore, the portrayal of climate change as ‘the root of the problem’ also fails to 
acknowledge the negative consequences of the South Sudanese government and institutions 
for e.g. their unjust distribution of resources and poor environmental management. Only a 
few documents highlighted other alternative socioeconomic and political factors, which 
contribute to the wider insecurities present in South Sudan. However, the reference to such 
factors within the discursive construction were very brief and vague. The documents were 
thus successful in downplaying the responsibility of the South Sudanese government and 
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national institutions. Rhetorically, it is very different refer to ‘issues related to governance 
and natural resources’ rather than ‘the actions of the government’s ineffective policies 
regarding the distribution of natural resources’.   
  
In terms of responsibility for acting and responding to the humanitarian crisis present in 
South Sudan, the UN documents emphasised predominantly the role of the international 
community. Only a few documents briefly mentioned the potential ways in which the complex 
mixture of violence and devastating effects of climate change could be contained in South 
Sudan. Such factors were e.g. effective governance and equal distribution of natural resources. 
However, these factors were only vaguely brought forward, and they were expressed without 
providing further explanations as to how or why. Thus, the discursive constructions within 
the documents can be said to have emphasised the need for the international community to act, 
whilst simultaneously victimising South Sudan by portraying an image of the country as 
‘unable’ to act in such complex situation. The low level of discourses focussing on resilience 
within the UN documents is also testimony to this.  
Despite its having no role in contributing to global warming, the country is at once 
highly vulnerable and least prepared to address looming threats systematically across 
sectors (UNDP, 2017a). 
Through no fault of its own, South Sudan is now suffering from the vagaries of a 
changing climate, which exacerbate the already enormous challenges caused by 
decades of political instability, poverty and persistent food insecurity (WFP: Phiri, 
2019). 
 
Both the victimisation and the portrayal of the South Sudanese communities as inherently 
vulnerable and uncapable; characteristics that only increase due to climate change, are 
problematic. They undermine the capabilities of the South Sudanese agency to adapt and 
learn from the complex interplay of climate change and conflict, presupposing South 
Sudanese to be just passive victims of climate-induced insecurity. The image feeds into the 
neo-colonial ideology that enforces the agenda of the developed countries who ‘know better’, 
rather than allowing the focus to be on finding homegrown solutions to the issue. The 
undermining of the African agency in solving its issues can pose a fundamental threat to the 
further development of the whole African region, including South Sudan (Ayodele, 
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2020). Through “indirect form of control by a superpower through cultural and economic 
means” (p.356) they enforce and withhold the unequal relations of power, creating further 
dependence between the developed world and developing countries such as South Sudan 
(Durokifa and Ijeoma, 2018). The discourses related to victimisation also enforce hierarchies 
that are based on the pre-determined criterion for industrialisation or development. As the 
effectiveness of climate solutions are often determined by the level of infrastructural 
preparedness and technological innovations, less developed states become characterised as 
‘backward’ or ‘unprepared’ (William et al., 2014). The hierarchisation also creates a dynamic 
where the less developed countries are forced to abide by the rules imposed on them and thus, 
countries such as South Sudan are always having to catch up in a structurally uneven playing 
field (William et al., 2014). 
  
The study of modality demonstrated mixed results in terms urgency within the documents. 
None of the arguments focussing on the relation between climate change and conflict were 
presented as absolute truths. The constructions of the arguments regarding climate change 
and conflict were also weak and vague in the sense that they were often not backed by 
sufficient facts or other references. Moreover, the fact that six of the documents did not 
identify any interrelations between the concepts of climate change and conflict, also speaks 
volumes on how the relationship is not given much emphasis or urgency.   
  
Finally, the study of vocabulary highlighted a few key words that were 
essential amongst the construction of UN discourses regarding climate change and conflict. 
Firstly, the word ‘security’ was employed in different contexts and with various meanings 
within the documents.  Overall, it is important to highlight that talking about ‘security’ rather 
than e.g. ‘vulnerability’ may propose a more traditional security focussed approach to the 
issue, shaping the context around it significantly. Therefore, the choice of words does always 
bear consequences. In the examined UN documents, the way in which the word ‘security’ 
was predominantly used emphasised issues regarding human security. Thus, the majority of 
the examined documents emphasised, first and foremost, the security of the South Sudanese 
people. They emphasised non-traditional conceptualisations of security such as food security 
and livelihood security, with the referent object being the local human beings. Such human 
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security focus is increasingly emphasised in the wider UN discourse. Only two documents 
(Gilruth, 2019; FAO, 2020) put some level of emphasis on climate-induced insecurity as a 
potential threat to global security, due to the potential ‘spill-over’ effects from South Sudan 
to the neighbouring countries and even outside of Africa. Despite being cautiously expressed 
and even partnered with the issue of human security, such statements can arguably create a 
sense of urgency for action, as well as strengthens the assumed link between the concept of 
climate change with more traditional security concerns. This, however, represents more 
profound issues.  For example, such arguments could be used to enforce the North’s 
ethnocentric perspective, which portrays the Global South as the barbaric Other, incapable to 
maintaining order at the face of adversity (Mgbeoji, 2006; Mauthener, 2013).  Meanwhile, 
similar assumptions are never made about the developed countries of the North. The rhetorical 
construction also undermines the scientific fact that climate change is a global issue, as well 
as creates a very deterministic and colonialist outlook for the understanding of the 
interlinkages between climate change and conflict. Furthermore, the conceptualisation of the 
South as a primeval Other justifies violence and denies the possibility of peaceful dialogue. 
It can also be used to justify any type of intervention by the North, whilst simultaneously 
obscuring their complicity in generating climatic and environmental problems through e.g. 
extractive industries, emissions, commercial agriculture, and the lack of land reform.  
 
The word ‘conflict’ is also invested with different meanings and connotations.  The 
documents included some instances where links between the ‘conflict’ and ‘climate change’ 
were being drawn through e.g. environmental degradation or resource scarcity. However, 
these were portrayed in rather cautious terms, which avoid using deterministic tones. The 
majority of the reference made to conflict, discussed it in terms of human security, disruption 
of agricultural production or the impediment of sustainable development.  Moreover, the 
word ‘conflict’ was most of the time used independently, without indication to any type of 
causal relationship. State and non-state conflicts are said to impede sustainable 
development, destroy local livelihoods, hinder agricultural production as well as lead 
to further food insecurity in South Sudan. The word ‘climate change’ is also discussed in 
varied ways. Some of the texts portray it to represent an independent ‘actor’, naturalising 
climate change as an actor. Alternative terms, such as ‘droughts’, ‘floods and ‘extreme 
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weather patterns’, were also present in the data. Only one source recognised South Sudan’s 
situation to be a “man-made crisis” (UNDP, 2017a). The linguistic construction of the threat 
by climate change and its relation to conflict focussed mainly on the detrimental effects it 
may have on human agency, which is a common approach for UN actors. 
   
4.2.2. Analysis of Discursive Practice  
 
The analysis of discursive practice is concerned with locating the varying discourses 
regarding climate change and conflict in the text and examining their interplay. It investigates 
how the text are produced and how they draw from the existing order of discourse (Fairclough, 
1992). Particularly interesting is to examine what discourses within the UN documents are 
dominant, present, absent or even silenced. The analysis of interdiscursivity identified the 
application of several different discourses, but at the same time revealed the discourses 
emphasising human security and resource scarcity to be more the most dominant within the 
documents that did address the relation. When the relation between climate change and 
conflict, through environmental degradation or resource scarcity, is being explicitly 
addressed, it is not described as the sole push factor, but rather as a component in an 
interactive mixture of factors alongside other political and socioeconomic components of 
vulnerability, such as poverty and underdevelopment. The argumentation related to human-
centred discourses is prevalent in the majority of the analysed documents. The portrayal of 
climate change as a threat to human security is thus very common. The most used discursive 
construction emphasised the notion of human security and particularly the devastating effects 
climate exacerbated vulnerabilities could have on food and livelihood security.  Articulations 
emphasising environmental conflict related discourses only figure in a few texts (e.g. Gilruth, 
2019), whilst being completely absent in the majority of analysed documents. 
Furthermore, within the documents in which these discourses are easily discernible, the text 
never solely draws upon that one discourse.  Rather they form part of a hybrid discourse, 
which mixes several branches of discourses. Discourses on resilience and cooperation 
were hardly present at all within the documents, which is interesting considering the 
institutional image of the UN system as the voucher of international cooperation and 
sustainable development goals.  In terms of intertextuality, it was not uncommon for 
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the examined UN actors to refer or to reference their own previous reports and 
studies or ones done by other UN actors. The fact that it can form the texts in such manner, 
emphasises UN’s credibility and powerful standing as a text producer. Academic references 
could only be found in two documents. 
 
The analysis of absences is considered to provide insightful information for social analysis 
(Fairclough, 1995). The biggest factors that are not present in the discourses, are the societal 
root causes, which have exposed the people of South Sudan to increasing vulnerability to 
climate change. In the rare occasions, when the underlining political and socioeconomic 
causes of vulnerability are addressed, they are recognised to be the cause of issues such 
structural inequalities or unequal development processes. However, explicit calls to tackle 
these causes are largely missing from the argumentation. For example, the responsibility of 
the South Sudanese government, institutions and national actors is hardly being highlighted 
within the documents.  Similarly, matters of climate justice are also silenced in the majority 
of the texts, apart from a few rare exceptions.   
 
 
4.2.3. The analysis of Social Practise  
 
The critical discourse analysis framework proposes that discourses are never decontextualised 
and isolated from the existing social practice. After having discussed the language and 
discursive meanings within the UN documents, this section focusses on further exploring 
the broader social contexts and structures in which examined the UN actors discuss 
the relation between climate change and conflict. It is important in order to fully grasp the 
intention, aims, the used language and the overall rationale of the documents.  The section 
will highlight some political, institutional, situational and financial means in which the 
portrayed discourses exist. The attempt here is to give context and to explain why such 
discourses have been utilised.  
 
Institutional  
 
The institutional standing of the examined UN actors as part of the UN structure also 
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influences the way discourses are produced. UN institutional reputation as the global 
peacemaker influence the way in which particularly issues with high volatility are discussed - 
the UN actors must be strategic in their approach, in order to not come across as the 
one pointing fingers and culpability particularly on their member states. What remains 
puzzling, is how the discourses focussing on adaptation, cooperation and resilience were not 
extensively underlined within the UN documents. 
 
Situational  
 
The situational context in South Sudan, in which the examined UN actors are operating is also 
rather complex. South Sudan as the world’s newest state continues to exist on a 
highly instable base. The on-going violence and intensifying effects of climate change are 
also the outcomes of years of structural violence, unjust governance and unfit development 
efforts.  For example, issues such as access have been on the table as the mobility of UN 
personnel, such as humanitarian workers and other specialists, is very restricted on the best 
of the days.  Maintaining good relationships between the government and communities 
around is of utmost importance for the operation of any agency. Thus, the UN actors’ 
discourses on climate change and conflict, which on an extremely vague level recognise the 
responsibility and culpability of the local authorities in contributing to vicious circle, can be 
understood as strategically created. The UN actors do recognise some factors related to 
responsibility and culpability of e.g. local authorities in combating the effects of climate 
change and conflict, yet this is textually done in an extremely vague manner that leaves a lot 
of facts unsaid. Thus, the ways in which the situation could be improved through better 
government policies and accountability is not made clear to the reader.  
 
Financial 
 
The financial context is also something to take into consideration, when examining the UN 
discourses. This context is not necessarily strictly attached only to the issues of climate change 
and conflict or their suggested interrelations. Moreover, it is a more universal issue for the 
UN and its various actors altogether. A large proportion of the funding that UN receives 
comes from donor countries from the global North.  Therefore, even though e.g. the issue of 
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climate justice is perceived highly important on the more general UN level, the different UN 
actors involved in country-specific projects may rhetorically want to leave such emphasis out, 
because of the risk of increasing tension or sparking potential disagreements between donor 
states. This could be particularly counterproductive for the UN actors’ ultimate purpose, 
which is to obtain the required funding for the survival of their on-going operations.   
 
4.2.4.  Summary of the analysis 
 
The critical examination of the UN discourses found some level of correlation between five 
and a half of the six hypotheses laid out in chapter 2. The only argumentation that could not 
be found from the documents was the one emphasising cooperation. The most dominant 
argumentations types emphasised resources scarcity and human security. The first one 
portrayed the interlinkage between climate change and conflict as climate change fuelling 
conflict over grazing areas between pastoralist and farmers, which emphasises particularly 
the issue of resource scarcity. The other one emphasised the increasing challenges posed by 
climate change to be exacerbated by on-going conflict, which then posed a risk to human 
security through e.g. increasing food insecurity. However, it is important to highlight that 
there were multiple discrepancies between the discourses within and between the documents. 
Furthermore, and even more surprisingly, six out of fifteen documents did not emphasise the 
interlinkages between climate change and conflict at all within their discursive construction, 
which can be understood as an indication of the lack of emphasis the UN actors are putting 
on the matter. 
 
Overall, even though UN actors recognise the implications of human action on climate 
change, only a few do this in a comprehensive and explicit manner. The responsibility of the 
South Sudanese agency, the local government and the international community was not 
widely discussed and even silenced, as the majority of the documents directly or indirectly 
portrayed climate change to be the main contributing agent for the issues posed in South 
Sudan. Such linguistic naturalisation can be problematic, as it conceals the various other 
contributing factors such as political and socioeconomic realities and the responsibility of the 
Global North for their greenhouse gas emissions. Another issue rising from such discursive 
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construction is the active victimisation of the South Sudanese agency, which creates an image 
of the South Sudanese communities as inherently incapable of resolving and adapting to their 
situations. In addition, it also feeds into neo-colonial ideologies that aim to enforce the agenda 
of the developed countries, who supposedly ’know better’ upon what is considered less 
developed or even backward. The victimisation nuances together with the low emphasis on 
the political and socioeconomic realities may help downplay the responsibility of the South 
Sudanese government for their ineffective actions and policies in handling the situation. The 
vocabulary choices also complement these argumentations, and the ideologies and structures 
of power are creating. However, to some extent, the discourses overall can be said have 
mirrored the highlighted institutional, situational and financial realities, in which the UN 
actors operate. 
 
Chapter 5: Discussions   
  
The chapter 5 will expand on the results drawn from the analysis to discuss to what extent do 
the UN discourses actually reflect the academic debates and the situation in South Sudan in 
addition to some explanations as to why this is the case. In terms of academic debates, the 
critical examination of the UN documents identified a broad mixture of overlapping, 
discrepant and vaguely presented discourses. Even though some of the UN documents are 
successful in referencing academic sources in constructing their discourses, the variety of 
these sources was limited: only two documents included academic references to back up the 
argumentation within their text. Many of the documents relied on referencing other UN 
documents, the statements of heads of state or media in constructing and justifying their 
discourses. Furthermore, six of the fifteen sources did not emphasise any type of interlinkages 
between climate change and conflict, but rather focussed on discussing the issues of climate 
and/or conflict separately, mainly in relation to the issue of food insecurity in South Sudan. 
This indicates that the interlinkages themselves are not given as big of an emphasis as the 
researcher expected at the start of the thesis process and that the discourses cannot be said to 
align comprehensively with the current academic debates either. The extent to which the UN 
discourses reflect the situation on the ground is also complex. The UN actors have 
successfully managed to highlight some realities of the South Sudan situation (e.g. the 
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emphasis on the impacts of livelihoods), whereas others have not been brought forward 
properly (e.g. socioeconomic and political factors such as inefficient governmental policies 
regarding natural resources). Furthermore, the fact that the issue of climate change and 
conflict in the context of South Sudan has not been given a greater emphasis within the UN 
discourses could be seen as problematic. Both the on-going state of violent conflict and the 
intensifying effects of climate change with increasingly erratic weather patterns represent 
significant issues for today’s South Sudan. Thus, a more comprehensive and holistic 
understanding of the relation between the two phenomena could greatly benefit the efforts to 
find sustainable and peaceful solutions for the country.  
 
There are a few potential explanations as to why there is only weak alignment between the 
examined UN discourses, the academic debates and the situation on the ground in South 
Sudan.  Firstly, as mentioned before, the UN actors did not rely 
on solely one conceptualisation of the relation between climate change and 
conflict to construct their discourses, but rather resulted in utilising several and at times 
overlapping conceptualisations, creating a series of different hybrid discourses. One 
possibility is that this somewhat incohesive approach reflects the fact that UN actors’ have 
not necessarily fully grasped all nuances of the relationship between climate change and 
conflict. This, however, also reflects the current theoretical climate regarding the topic within 
academia as highlighted in the theoretical framework. As the academic field is yet to agree 
upon the nature of the relationship between climate change and conflict and how the two 
phenomena even should be defined, it is no surprise that the UN actors have resulted in 
portraying the situation in South Sudan in such varying ways.  The downfall of such 
inconsistencies and uncertainty is that they may potentially hamper the adoption of effective 
and sustainable policies on the issue of climate change in South Sudan. Another potential 
reason hindering the UN actors’ abilities to align their discursive constructions with the 
current academic literature and the situation in the ground in South Sudan is the lack of 
empirical data.  The availability of data has been a problem for the overall study of the 
interlinkages, and it has proven to be an even greater issue in the context of South 
Sudan.  Furthermore, the lack of emphasis on the issues regarding political and 
socioeconomic factors as well as climate justice, present in the UN discourses on South 
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Sudan, can also been seen as a way to shrink the responsibility of both the international 
community and the South Sudanese government and institutions. However, it can also be 
understood as a conscious tactic to push forward an image or agenda of the UN systems’ 
neutrality and impartiality.  By silencing both the questions related to accountability and the 
political and socioeconomic factors within the discursive construction, the actors embrace 
“the depoliticised stance of UN (Mason, 2014, p. 806)”. Thus, to support the purpose of the 
whole UN system in “maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly 
relations among nations and promoting social progress, better living standards and human 
rights” (UN, 2015), the UN actors are forced to push forward certain agendas that reflect the 
apolitical stance, which is required to hold on to a level of neutrality before the eyes of its 
member states. Furthermore, it is also said to be easier to convince the ‘audience’, whether it 
is the international community or the South Sudanese state actors, to act against a threat such 
as climate change, when it is clearly defined as an external enemy (Kester & Sovacol, 2017).  
 
Overall, the analysis here concludes that the UN discourses regarding the interlinkages 
between climate change and conflict cannot be said to comprehensively reflect the academic 
literature and the current situation on the ground. The inconsistency of the discourses and 
concealment of certain critical and politicised factors may hinder the credibility and efficiency 
of the examined UN actors and their work in South Sudan in the long run. The amount of 
discrepancies is particularly concerning, as it may hinder the ability of the actors to adapt and 
enforce sustainable and effective policies to aid the South Sudan to transform their society 
towards a more peaceful and resilient future.  Moreover, the highlighted neo-colonial nuances 
in some of the discourses may also come across as alarming. The dilution of responsibility 
together with the self-referential nature of the identified UN discourses feed into this idea that 
emphasises the superiority of UN produced knowledge, which simultaneously also solidifies 
the actors’ positions of power. As the majority of the examined documents lacked academic 
references, the discourses make it seem as if the UN actors were the main legitimate source 
of information on the matter. These factors then allow the UN actors to continue to push the 
agendas they see fit and useful, even if that comes at the expense of the South Sudanese 
agency. 
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Concluding Remarks  
 
With the specific research interest in the case of South Sudan, the thesis examined how the 
UN actors have portrayed the interlinkages between climate change and conflict in their 
discursive construction, in addition to discussing the extent to which these UN discourses 
actually coincided with the known academic debates as well as the situation on the ground in 
South Sudan. The analysis was conducted by mapping the set of hypothetical discourses, 
drawn from the theoretical framework, against the data in order to understand how the UN 
discourses reflected what we know about the link between climate change and conflict.  The 
research found that the UN utilised a mixture of different argumentation types in describing 
the interlinkages, creating so-called ‘hybrid-discourses’ that varied not only across actors but 
also within one agency’s documents. The majority of discourses were constructed and 
presented in a rather vague and discrepant manner that most likely intended to maintain an 
apolitical stance. Argumentation emphasising aspects of human security and resource scarcity 
was the most dominant amongst the discovered discourses. Only the argumentation 
emphasising cooperation was completely absent within the documents, which was interesting 
considering the nature of UN system as a facilitator of international cooperation. More 
importantly and surprisingly, the thesis also discovered that discourses focussing on the 
interlinkages between climate change and conflict were not as widely present within the 
examined UN documents as expected. Almost half of the documents did not discuss the 
interlinkages at all, which speaks volumes of the low level of urgency the UN actors are 
putting on the matter in the context of South Sudan.   
 
The further critical examination through Fairclough’s three-dimensional theory also revealed 
how the responsibility of the South Sudanese agency, the local government and the 
international community was not widely discussed and even silenced in many of the UN 
discourses. Many of the documents utilised argumentation that directly or indirectly portrayed 
climate change to be the main contributing and even independent agent for the issues posed 
by South Sudan. Such linguistic naturalisation is problematic, as it conceals the various other 
contributing factors, such as crucial political and socioeconomic factors as well as the 
responsibility of the Global North for their greenhouse gas emissions. Another issue rising 
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from such discursive construction is the active victimisation of the South Sudanese agency, 
which creates an image of the South Sudanese communities as inherently incapable resolving 
and adapting to their situation. Moreover, it also feeds into the Neo-colonial ideologies, which 
enforce the agenda of the developed countries, who supposedly ’know better’, upon countries 
such as South Sudan. The victimisation together with the low emphasis on the political and 
socioeconomic realities successfully downplay the responsibility of the South Sudanese 
government for their ineffective actions and policies in handling the situation which the 
country faces. The vocabulary also complemented these argumentations, and the ideologies 
and structures of power they have created. Overall, the discourses however mirrored, to an 
extent, the explained institutional, situational and financial realities in which the UN actors 
operate. 
 
The discussions chapter highlighted that the UN discourses on climate change and 
conflict demonstrated low alignment with current academic debates and the known situation 
on the ground in South Sudan. The critical examination of the discourses discovered 
discrepancies and even silencing of some of the argumentations, indicating that the actors 
may not fully grasp all the nuances of the relationship between climate change and conflict in 
the context of South Sudan or they are choosing consciously or unconsciously to not discuss 
them as comprehensively as they could. . However, it is important to understand that the lack 
of engagement in terms of the nuances of the interlinkages is not that surprising, considering 
how discrepant the field of academic debates on the topic is. The current amount of available 
empirical data on the interlinkages and the case of South Sudan is also not sufficient for 
reaching a truly comprehensive and nuanced research outcomes. More case specific empirical 
research is particularly needed in order to have a better understanding of the theoretical and 
situational grounds, as well as to create greater alignment. Furthermore, the decision to 
portray the interlinkages in such vague and discrepant manner may also be seen as an 
intentional attempt by the UN actors to withhold their organisational neutrality 
and depoliticised stance as the insurer of global peace.   Overall, the UN discourses on 
climate change and conflict cannot be said to comprehensively reflect the academic literature 
and the situation on the ground, which may ultimately hinder the UN actors’ abilities to fulfil 
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their goal of helping the South Sudanese people move towards sustainable peace and a more 
resilient and prosperous future. 
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